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Introduction and summary
The question of whether and how decisions or “policies” get carried out in practice
has long been dealt with by both economists and political scientists. Prominent ex-
amples addressing issues of policy implementation are those involving agent discretion
in principal-agent relationships of firms or political institutions according to Laffont
(2000) or Laffont & Martimort (2002), Vaubel (1994), Epstein & O’Halloran (1999)
and Franchino (2005). Informational asymmetries between the respective agent and the
principal decision-maker have frequently been found to lead to discrepancies between the
principal’s decision and the actual policy outcome undertaken by the agent.
In the interconnected world of today the increasing complexity of institutional settings
provide ever more leeway for policy discretion and non-compliance by agents. Multi-
layered institutional settings are created by the processes of European and global inte-
gration, making the issues of agent discretion and non-compliance even more relevant.
Transparency and democratic legitimation can no longer be taken for granted, neither in
the process of decision-making nor regarding the implementation of political decisions.
For instance, the signatory countries of the Kyoto protocol have encountered, and are in-
deed still encountering, substantial difficulties in putting the imposed emission standards
into practice. As regards Europe, the construction of an integrated high-speed railway
system and the regulation of the legal protection of biotechnological inventions are two
recent cases in which the EU Commission had a hard time enforcing implementation
among members countries. Reaching a political decision on these policy issues is just
one side of the coin. Implementing them in a timely, correct and complete manner is
what is necessary to guarantee the functioning of our environment and economies and,
non the least, to remain credible to the public.
Against this background, this thesis aims to shed light on the political-economic
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factors explaining the policy outcomes of the following three, particularly European and
political, issues:
The first is the geographic allocation of the three largest European cultural institutes,
namely the British Council, the Institut Franc¸ais and the Goethe-Institut. Based on the
organisational relation of the three cultural agents with their respective governmental
principal, chapter 1 evaluates the cultural, political and economic factors guiding the
British, French and German public diplomacies.
The second and third issue deal with the transposition process of EU directives in the
EU15 member states, which we conceive as two-fold: First, member state governments
decide whether they are generally willing to transpose a given directive. Second, provided
they are, the adequate legal transposition instrument has to be selected and applied on
the national stage. Only if EU directives have successfully been transposed into national
legislation they can be put into practice by the national authorities, i.e. national and
regional administrations and courts.
Chapter 2 accordingly analyses the political economic characteristics explaining dif-
ferences in the type of legal instrument used by the member states for the transposition
of EU law into national legislation. This issue seems particularly important from a nor-
mative political perspective. Thus, the national balance of power may be threatened if,
through the process of EU-law transposition, member state executives could administer
legislative competences at the cost of national parliaments. This would be the case, for
instance, if a large amount of EU directives would be transposed via secondary ‘admin-
istrative’ legal transposition devices that do not include a majority decision of national
parliaments. A fair part of EU law may thus come into effect without the passage of the
democratically legitimated governmental bodies, i.e. the national and EU parliaments.
Chapter 3 finally focuses on the first part of the transposition puzzle, namely the
government’s transposition willingness. Building on the empirical results of chapter 2 it
also tries to further elaborate on the policy dimension. Linking classical fiscal federalist
theory to the study of Europeanization, it investigates whether cross-country cross-sector
transposition records are higher in policy areas in which legislative power is efficiently
centralized to the EU level. According to classical fiscal federalist theory, policies are
centralized efficiently if externalities are relatively high and preference asymmetries are
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relatively low in a given policy area. Thus, if member states consider the overall utility
of a union, we would accordingly expect transposition ratios to be higher in policy areas
where expected externalities are relatively high and preference heterogeneity relatively
low.
Besides their strong focus on European policy aspects, all three chapters are con-
nected by their modern political economy perspective, applying advanced econometric
tools to real-life political questions. Further, all chapters have been developed in inter-
disciplinary research co-operations between economists, political scientists and, where
necessary, cultural practitioners and legal experts. This bears the advantage of ‘paint-
ing the full picture’ of the cultural allocation and the transposition puzzles although,
clearly, the emphasis of this thesis lies on the detection of political-economic explana-
tions. Finally, although large-scale quantitative empirical work is sometimes criticized
for being less related to practice than in-depth case studies such econometric approaches
allow the easy comparison of a larger number of subjects (e.g. individuals, countries or
policy areas) in a systematic and transparent way. This offers the opportunity to take
on a bird’s eye view of complex settings and not to lose sight of the wood for the trees.
In the author’s opinion, it is exactly this feature that makes quantitative approaches
an attractive, convenient and necessary complement to case-specific in-depth analysis of
political outcomes such as the ones at hand.
In summary, this thesis comes to the following conclusions based on the empirical
analyses of chapters 1, 2 and 3:
Regarding the geographic allocation of the three largest European cultural institutes,
we find that the probability to host a cultural institute is significantly and positively
influenced by the amount of bilateral trade interactions and former colonial ties. Small,
wealthy and democratic countries are somehow discriminated against when it comes to
the worldwide allocation of cultural satellites. Regarding the amount of staff in a selected
host country, policy discretion is found to play a statistical significant role for all three
institutes: according to our results, staff numbers are significantly higher in host countries
that are attractive from a tourist vantage point, i.e. in host countries counting a large
number of European travelers per year. This is even more so in institutional settings
where the cultural agent enjoys relatively little autonomy of the respective foreign office
10
as, for instance, the Institut Franc¸ais in our investigation.
With respect to the transposition of EU law in the member states, we find that
member states’ primary transposition ratios, i.e. the ratio of directives transposed via
majority decision in national parliaments to total transpositions, to be generally low
when averaged across time and policy areas. From a country perspective, primary trans-
position ratios appear lower in member states with a strong government, relative to
both parliamentary opposition and to coalition size. Further, member states seem to
transpose less via parliament toward the end of an election period and if they receive a
large amount of EU transfers. Wealthier countries, however, generally transpose more
via primary transposition instruments. From a policy perspective, we find that mem-
ber states prefer secondary transposition devices for directives touching upon technical
sectors or sectors with a high lobbying potential. Primary transposition instruments are
preferably used in sectors characterized by high labour compensation. Our main sector
characteristic, i.e. economic sector importance, came out playing a significant role for
the type of legal transposition instrument used. Although the direction of this effect still
needs further specification.
Regarding the willingness of a member state government to transpose EU directives,
we find transposition ratios to increase significantly with the degree of parliamentary
fragmentation, with the size of a country and with the amount of intra-EU15 exports a
country is undertaking. In contrast, institutional veto players and national sector saliency
are found to be the main obstacles to transposition. With respect to our main policy-
oriented hypotheses based on classical fiscal federalist theory, we find that member states
indeed seem to consider the union’s benefits in their transposition decision. According
to our empirical results, member states are more willing to transpose EU directives
in policy areas that are efficiently centralized at the EU level and reveal higher levels
of externalities. However, compared to sectors with high preference asymmetries, we
find member states to transpose significantly more in sectors with medium preference
asymmetries but significantly less if preference heterogeneity is low.
Interestingly, different sets of macroeconomic, institutional and political indicators
seem to explain variations in a country’s willingness to transpose and a country’s choice
of legal transposition instruments. According to chapters 2 and 3, member states tend
11
to transpose more in years of parliamentary election but less via primary transposition
devices involving national parliaments. Further and against the results of prior studies in
the Europeanization literature, we find member countries to be more willing to transpose
if they receive large net EU transfers. However, net EU recipients also seem to preferably
transpose via secondary legislation.
The remainder of this thesis is structured into three main parts, chapters 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Each chapter is followed by its own appendix providing additional deriva-
tions, tables and figures. Finally, an overall conclusion provides some possible policy
implications and a brief outlook.
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Chapter 1
Here, there, everywhere? Evaluating
the allocation of three European
cultural institutes around the world1
I want her everywhere and if she’s beside me I know I need never care.
“Here, There, Everywhere”, The Beatles
1.1 Introduction
Although cultural diplomacy is a key part of the foreign policy of all nation states, we
know little about its causes and consequences. This article tries to narrow this research
gap through a systematic analysis of the political geography of foreign cultural policy.
We start from the puzzle of why the geographic priorities of the foreign cultural institutes
that the three largest European states – France, Germany and the United Kingdom –
entertain differ widely. Our analysis then pursues two goals: First, we evaluate the
political-economic and cultural criteria that influence the varying attention that these
nations pay to different world regions and host countries. Second, we investigate whether
1This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Gerald Schneider, University of Constance. Earlier
versions have been presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 2005 in Granada, the EWACE
2nd European Workshop on Applied Cultural Economics 2005 in Catania, and the Econometric Seminar
of the University of Bonn.
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different levels of autonomy attributed to the cultural diplomats are able to explain
variations in the location of the institutes’ staff. More specifically, we ask whether the
relative cultural or tourist attractiveness of a host country influences the number of
employees that are sent there.
We assume for all three countries under examination that the foreign ministry is
largely able to decide where a representation shall be set up, while the cultural institute
itself dictates the number of employees that should be sent to a host country. Accordingly,
we suppose that political-economic considerations and the desire to promote the national
culture and language abroad will determine the geographic distribution of institutes
around the world. Cultural interests and the attractiveness of the host country in return
should be responsible for the number of employees that are working within a particular
host country. Based on the theory of bureaucracy of Niskanen (1968, 1971) we evaluate
two competing explanations of the effect of bureaucrats’ discretionary interests on policy
outcomes. As Vaubel (1994), Laffont & Martimort (2002) and Laffont (2000) argue,
informational asymmetries might allow the collusion of bureaucrats to the detriment
of the voters, especially in policy areas that the public largely ignores. Intuitively, we
perceive the possibility of interest collusion among bureaucrats of the foreign ministry
and cultural institute to be higher the lower the level of autonomy is that politicians
grant to the cultural agents. Conversely, studies in political science as for instance
Epstein & O’Halloran (1999) and Franchino (2005) stress the importance of institutional
arrangement as a key factor that determines the discretionary power of an administrative
agent. They lead us to hypothesize that formally autonomous institutes are better able
to pursue narrow bureaucratic self-interests in their personnel policy than their more
restricted counterparts in some other countries.
Our empirical evaluation largely confirms the economic “collusion model” and thus
the suspicion that the most restricted agent, the Institut Franc¸ais (IF), is most prone
to allowing “second-order” tourist criteria to influence its personnel policy. Although
this cultural institute enjoys less autonomy than the Goethe-Institut (GI) or the British
Council (BC), its dependence on the ministry seems to create a collusion of interests
between foreign cultural diplomats employed in the French embassies and the public
administrators who work on behalf of the IF within a particular host country.
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The article is structured as follows: We first present information on the history and
the organisation of the three cultural “missionaries”. Next, we summarize the literature
on these cultural agents. Finally, we present our empirical results after sketching the
theoretical argument and describing our research design.
1.2 Cultural diplomacy of three European states:
history, academic writing, organisation
Since a long time, all three countries under examination have used cultural institutes
to advance their national interests abroad. The GI was re-launched after World War
II to promote German culture and language abroad; the BC was founded in 1934 and
appointed its first overseas representatives in Egypt, Poland and Portugal in 1938, and
France even declares itself to be the first state which has practiced foreign cultural
policy abroad. The IF in Madrid was already established in 1909. By 1933, 28 other
French institutes had been founded in other European cities that were deemed sufficiently
important. Since World War II great networks of the GI2, the IF and the BC have been
built around the world. In July 2002, 141 GIs were present in 77 countries3, 151 IF in 92
countries 4 and 226 BCs in 109 countries5. Slight differences compared to the descriptive
statistics that we present later are due to the exclusion of the national institutes.
To enhance mutual understanding and friendship after World War II, Germany and
France have invested considerably in this particular foreign policy instrument to pacify
their historically loaded relationship. While France subsidises 16 cultural institutes on
German grounds, Germany currently maintains nine satellites in its neighboring country.
If we look at all possible host countries, major differences in the importance attributed to
a specific region or nation become obvious. One striking example is Asia where the BC
2The French cultural institutes have various names such as Institut Franc¸ais, Centre Culturel Franc¸ais
or, since the 1990s, also Centre de Coope´ration Culturelle et Linguistique (CCCL). According to Znined-
Brand (1999, 129f) there exists no real formal difference and they all pursue the same mission. They
are therefore treated as “Institut Franc¸ais” institutes throughout this analysis.
3Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes (2003)
4Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res (2002b, p. 55)
5British Council (2002b)
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maintained more than 40 institutes in 2002, corresponding to 21% of the total British
satellites, compared to 20 GIs (15%) and only eleven (7,6%) French institutes6. Figure
1.1 summarizes the geographical priorities of the three institutes in 2002.
Figure 1.1: Total number of cultural institutes per region; Note: Western Hem. =
Western Hemisphere; Europe-TC = Eastern European Transition Countries; Europe-
IC = Western European Industrial Countries; Other-IC = Other Industrial Countries.
Sources: Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes (2001a), Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res: Bu-
reau des e´tablissements culturels et des alliances franc¸aises, British Council Headquar-
ters: Planning, Research and Evaluation Section, International Monetary Fund (2001).
As it becomes clear from Figure 1.1, the BC saw its priorities in Asia and the tran-
sition countries; a tendency that has even become more pronounced after it stated its
willingness in the beginning of 2007 to further reduce its European presence. The IF, by
contrast, had in the time period under examination an African and a Western European
focus, whereas the profile of the GI is relatively unclear according to our categorization
of countries. We can also see some differences in the size of these institutes: whereas the
UK sent 128 employees (2,93%) to Portugal, the delegations of France and Germany in
this EU member state only amounted to 39 (0,66%) and 43 (1,71%) of their institutes’
overall staff. On the other hand, the IF ordered 98 (1,65%) and the GI 50 (1,95%) of its
6In spring 2006, the GI announced its plans to reduce the number of representations in Europe and
to launch more foreign cultural institutes in East Asia and the Islamic world. These plans led to a
public debate and the decision by the German government to curtail further budget reductions in this
domain. The GI itself decided to keep its European network intact, but to continue its expansionary
ambitions in other continents.
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Figure 1.2: Total number of cultural institutes’ staff per region
employees to Poland whereas the BC paid 31 employees (0,71%) in the Middle European
EU member state.
Cultural diplomacy across the three member states does, however, not only differ in
the number of institutes and personnel that the three EU member states entertain around
the world. We can also observe organizational differences which largely stem from the way
in which authority is delegated in this policy area. Table 1.2 below provides an overview
of the organizational structures. We identify the ministry in charge of the cultural agents,
briefly characterize the organizational structure, describe the responsible organization for
strategic decision making and determine the formal and budgetary independency of the
institutes. According to these criteria, the final distinction determines the formal level
of autonomy for each foreign cultural institute.
As can be seen in Table 1.2, France uses the most centralized decision making struc-
ture and leaves the satellite institutes very little autonomy in finding a local approach for
the advancement of French culture and language abroad. Looking at the other extreme,
the UK grants its cultural agent remarkable organizational independence and freedom in
strategic decision-making. The GI entertains a medium position; although it is legally
largely independent, it has a limited financial autonomy, as the Auswa¨rtige Amt (AA),
i.e. the German Foreign Ministry, and the Bundestag, i.e. the lower federal parliamen-
tary chamber, still dominate decision making on the budget. The AA also has to approve
the location decision proposed by the steering committee.
Although cultural diplomacy does not enjoy the same prominence in public perception
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Oranisational feature Institut Franc¸ais (IF) Goethe-Institut e.V. (GI) British Council (BC)
Responsible governmental
ministry
The French Foreign Of-
fice: Ministe`re des Affaires
Etrange`res, Direction Ge´ne´rale
de la Coope´ration Interna-
tionale et du De´veloppement
(DGCID).
The German Foreign Office:
Auswa¨rtiges Amt (AA).
The British Foreign Office:
Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO).
Organizational status Direct governmental outpost. Registered charity association. Registered charity organiza-
tion.
Institutional relation be-
tween government and cul-
tural institute
IFs are hierarchically depen-
dent on the conseillers culturels
of the French embassies and
thus the DGCID.
GI enjoys contractually del-
egated authority according
to the Rahmenvertrag of
01/17/2001 with the German
Foreign Office.
As an executive non-
departmental public body,
BC operates independently of
the government but govern-
ment is ultimately responsible
for it.
High-level strategic deci-
sion making
General strategic orientation
by foreign affairs ministry.
DGCID as central planning
and coordination section
of France’s foreign cultural
activities. The “projet
d’e´tablissement” is decided
by the “conseil d’orientation”
and approved by the “Sous-
direction de la coope´ration
culturelle et artistique, bureau
des e´tablissements culturels et
des alliances franc¸aises”.
General strategic decisions by
the steering committee consist-
ing of the GI president, six
members elected by the gen-
eral assembly, one member of
the AA and the Ministry of
Finance, and three members
elected by the employees of the
GI on a four year term. The
geographical allocation of cul-
tural institutes is decided by
the steering committee with
the final approval of the AA
(§4).
Decisions on general strategy
for the direction and the man-
agement of the BC and Board
of Trustees of BC appointing
its own members for five years,
Only one of 21 is nominated by
the Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Af-
fairs.
Financing Mainly by budget share of the
DGCID.
Main budgetary share by the
AA and the Federal Press Of-
fice, which on its behalf has
to be approved by the German
Bundestag. Alternative finan-
cial means e.g. through spon-
soring and the provision of GI
services make up almost 1/3 of
the 2001 budget.
FCO gives an annual grant-in-
aid of about 40% of the BC’ s
overall budget; more than half
of the budget is earned by the
BC itself through the provision
of various services to private
people, the government, or in-
ternational organizations.
Overall level of autonomy Low Medium High
Table 1.1: Organisation and autonomy levels of the BC, IF and
GI; Sources: Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res (2002b); Znined-Brand
(1999, 124-130); Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes (2001a); Goethe-
Institut Inter Nationes (2001b); Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes (2003);
British Council (2000); Interview with the research division of the
British Council Headquarters, London; British Council (2002a); Lee
(1995).
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as security policy and economic diplomacy, some political and cultural elites see in it
an important instrument to promote national interests abroad. In 1966, Willy Brandt,
then German foreign minister, called it “the third column of foreign policy making”
Dahrendorf (1978, p. 14). In the European Union, the Commission tries to harmonize
cultural policy making including foreign cultural policy of its member states largely
through subsidizing multilateral projects. Yet, we do not really know how effective such
attempts are.
Until now, foreign cultural policy has been largely neglected in the systematic study of
public policy making. Most research is historical and qualitative, focusing on the foreign
cultural policy of a particular country or some of the satellite institutes. Flecks (1992)and
Trommer (1984), for instance, shed light on the effects and the general infrastructure
of German foreign cultural agents. Regarding the GI, Kramer (1997) and Ulrich (1987)
analyze the experiences of the GI in their dialogue with non-European cultures and the
broad performance of the GI as a special foreign cultural instrument. Lippert (1996)
elucidates the role of foreign cultural policy for the German “Ostpolitik”, referring to
the negotiations in Moscow from 1969 to 1990. Much in line with the research question
posed in this article, Schneider & Schiller (2000) analyze the location decisions of the
GI. They show that it is not only the official mandate to improve the standing of the
German language and culture around the world which influences the GI’s geographic
patterns. Bilateral trade and other economic factors are much more important than
these official objectives for the conduct of the German cultural diplomacy. As their
quantitative analysis reveals, the location of the institutes does also not respond to
“good governance” criteria and other developmental goals that the German governments
under chancellors Kohl and Schro¨der introduced in the 1990s.
One has to look closely for scientific work on the BC. Lee (1995) examined the re-
organization of the management of the BC. The re-structuring of the BC in the 1980s is,
in his view, marked by the traditional distinction between short-term cultural diplomacy
as practiced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the long-term cultural
relations of the BC. Stemming from this distinction, the FCO’s and the Council’s foreign
cultural policy interests differ to some degree. Lee further emphasizes how organizational
changes touching the Council’s dependence on the FCO have affected its geographic
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strategy.
For the IF, Meunier (2000) and Ingram (1998) identify a nationalist turn in the
French cultural policy. Popaczy (1999) refers to the IFs in Vienna and Innsbruck in
order to describe the development from understanding foreign cultural work as pure
cultural export to practicing real cultural exchange. Various case studies analyse specific
locations of the French institutes, for example Lachner (1999) for Innsbruck or Wichmann
(1997) for Berlin.
Comparative studies in the field of foreign cultural policy are very rare. In her
doctoral dissertation, Znined-Brand (1999) closely evaluates the differences between the
goals, as well as the formal and the financial organization of the two cultural institutes.
She argues that the goal of German foreign cultural policy is to keep contact with the
German Diaspora, to foster “Deutschtum”, to strengthen economic ties and to advance
specific political issues. France’s foreign cultural policy, in her view is driven mainly by
ideological but also by economic incentives, reflecting the deeply rooted will to spread
the language and culture of the Grande Nation. In a classical study, Peisert (1978)
compares the foreign cultural policies of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy
and the United States, using partly linear regression models to account for geographical
priorities. His book, however, is rather dated and does not account for recent changes.
More recently, Brodersen (1993) has compared how the French, the Italian, the Austrian
and the German foreign cultural agents function. This descriptive study focuses on
language teaching and cultural exchange projects. Moreover, he shows the effects of the
different European cultural institutes on the Polish city Krakow, looking at the level of
co-operation among the four cultural agents.
What lacks so far, however, are theoretically-founded comparative analyses that can
explain the differences between the foreign cultural services of the three largest EU
member states. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the criteria that
guide the geographic priorities of the IF, the GI and the BC. These agents have the
longest traditions among the European foreign cultural institutes, and since the number
of institutes and personnel around the world is large, a systematic comparative analysis
is feasible.
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1.3 Theory and hypotheses
In our conception of cultural diplomacy we assume the foreign ministries and their cul-
tural agents to face a two-step decision problem of the allocation of institutes and per-
sonnel around the world. We thereby perceive the question whether to “enter” a host
country as a joint one between the government and the respective institute. Once agree-
ment is reached on the overall location, we assume the cultural agents in the second
step of the location decision to solely determine the number of staff for the selected
host countries thereby taking the wishes of the governmental principal into account to
varying degrees. Regarding the location preferences of the two actors, we assume that
foreign ministries strive for economic growth and political stability. The government
is supposed to prefer policies that maximize its chance of re-election. The institutes’
boards, by contrast, should place their officially stated cultural missions higher in the
list of priorities, not the least to secure the budget for their organization. We therefore
imagine them to pay attention to human capital and socio-political characteristics of
a host country which would render the cultural activities more successful. Moreover,
to guarantee the safety of the employees and the longevity of their institution, cultural
institutes should prefer politically stable democracies. As the concept of “good gov-
ernance” implies, governments might also want to reward countries for the respect of
democratic values (Zanger (2000), Schneider & Schiller (2000)). However, compared
to the aforementioned political-economic interests, the level of democracy should play
a rather secondary role in a government’s strategic decision on cultural diplomacy. In
summary, we propose the probability for establishing a cultural institute to increase
the greater economic and political interests from a governmental vantage point and the
greater human capital and political stability from the institutes’ point of view. Address-
ing the differences in governmental and cultural incentives, Lee (1995) writes about the
role of the BC:
“The Council had always found it difficult to reconcile ‘country objectives’ with the
cross-cutting issues that arose from general foreign policy questions. The distinction
between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy was interpreted as one between long-
term objectives of mutual understanding between peoples and short-term interests of
commercial or political advantage”.
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For the allocation of staff across the chosen host countries, we suppose that if their
official missions were really important to the cultural institutes, they would strive for
a maximum potential audience for their cultural programmes, language courses and ex-
aminations. As a large number of language course participants and a high demand for
cultural activities would strengthen their position in negotiations with their government,
institutes should preferably assign more staff to countries with a sufficiently high de-
mand from literate, well educated people. Besides this, institutes should favor stable
democracies to guarantee secure working conditions for their staff members.
However, in line with Niskanen(1968, 1971), we also perceive the cultural institutes
as bureaucratic agents which act self-interestedly. On the one hand they might aim to
fulfill their “official mission” of foreign cultural policy. On the other hand, however, we
suspect them to use their discretionary power in order to improve their personal well-
being during a mission abroad. Since they will profit from these decisions themselves,
we assume decision makers within the cultural organization to prefer sending more per-
sonnel to locations that are interesting from a tourist vantage point. Put differently, we
expect the cultural agents to not only strive to fulfill their officially stated missions but
also to “follow the sunshine” in their personnel policy. We build on the assumption of
differing degrees of autonomy and two contrasting arguments of the literature in order
to derive comparative hypotheses about the level to which such discretion might govern
the personnel policy of our three cultural agents. First, we refer to collusion theory. In
democracies, elected officials and public administrators are directly responsible to the
voters if they want to be re-elected. Foreign cultural policy, however, is a policy area
about which voters are not well informed. As Vaubel (1994) argues and Laffont & Mar-
timort (2002) and Laffont (2000) indirectly imply, this asymmetry allows politicians and
bureaucrats to build a tacit alliance which works to the detriment of voters. We presume
that such collusive behaviour is most pronounced for institutes that are not autonomous
and where politicians and public administrators are able to shield themselves against
public scrutiny. More autonomous institutes probably have to be better in justifying
their activities in budgetary negotiations and presumably face greater market pressures
than politically and financially dependent organizations. This should particularly be the
case for an agent like the BC whose income depends more on the success of its own ac-
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tivities than for the two other institutes under examination which, by and large, depend
on the goodwill of badly informed voters. Based on our autonomy assumption, we can
thus formulate the following proposition as our “collusion model”:
H1 Discretionary private interests affect the German location of staff less than France’s,
but more than the UK’s.
∂staff lniF
∂aiF
>
∂staff lniG
∂aiG
>
∂staff lniUK
∂aiUK
This conjecture stands in contrast to the political science literature on principal-agent
relations. Here, the focus lies on the effects which certain institutional arrangements ex-
ert on public policy. The prevailing assumption is that institutionally more autonomous
agents have greater discretionary power. Lately, various studies have investigated how
the division of power between competing institutions and political preferences delimits
the discretionary power of agents within the European Union (e.g. Franchino (2005)),
the United States (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran (1999)) or the advanced democracies in
general (Huber & Shipan (2002)). The general thrust of these contributions to the prin-
cipal agent literature is that “shirking” by public officials is largely a consequence of
the power that the executive and legislative branch grants them. Obviously, delega-
tion is necessary from an informational point of view. However, the advantages of an
independent bureaucracy diminish the more extreme the preferences of the agents are.
Although the formal autonomy of a foreign cultural institute is not a sufficient condi-
tion for “shirking”, it is, in the view of the political science literature on delegation, a
necessary prerequisite for doing so. Moreover, agents can, as a rich literature in political
science points out, profit from disagreement among multiple principals (e.g. McCubbins
(1985), Miller & Moe (1983), Weingast & Moran (1983)). Such controversies increase
the discretionary power of the agent or, in other words, its “bureaucratic drift”. Such
a possibility exists most pronouncedly for the GI which faces the Foreign Ministry and
the Parliament as its main principals.
Anticipating a positive effect of autonomy on policy discretion we therefore hypoth-
esize for our “autonomy model”:
H2 Discretionary private interests affect the German location of staff less than the UK’s,
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but more than France’s.
∂staff lniF
∂aiF
<
∂staff lniG
∂aiG
<
∂staff lniUK
∂aiUK
Our empirical analysis will reveal whether the “collusion” or the “autonomy” model
is more accurate in explaining the worldwide allocation of British, German and French
staff.
1.4 Research design
1.4.1 Estimation method
A cross-sectional Heckman-selection seems to be an appropriate estimation procedure
for our empirical investigation. We apply two model specifications: first, we estimate
an ’overall’ cross-section Heckman model in order to evaluate the general criteria for the
location decisions of the three European foreign cultural institutes. Second, we estimate
cross-section Heckman models with individually free parameters for the British, the
German and the French cases.
The two-step character of the Heckman procedure fits our theoretical argument.
Whereas the decision to make a specific country subject to cultural diplomacy in the
first place is modeled as a joint one between the cultural institute and the government,
we assume the cultural agents to follow rather personal interests in their allocation of
staff to the chosen host countries. With regard to the number of staff per host country
as our second step dependent variable, we have to deal with non-random selection bias
stemming from the truncated country sample for the second-stage regression. From an
econometric perspective, the Heckman estimation is a reasonable solution for models
with selection bias and the only consistent one in the case of significant non-random
sample selection (Heckman (1979)). We test for statistical significance of the selection
parameter lambda, the coefficient of the added hazard rates of non-selection (equiva-
lently referred to as the inverse Mill’s ratios) in the second-stage OLS regressions of the
Heckman models. A formal derivation of the estimator is provided in the appendix.
Considering the count character of our second stage dependent variable staff we addi-
tionally compared the results of the standard second stage OLS regression (with logged
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staff numbers as dependent variable) with those of a negative binomial regression (with
the actual staff numbers as dependent variable). As results did not change with respect
to the signs and significance levels, we opted for the standard Heckman procedure with
a log-transformed dependent variable for the ease of interpretation and to conform with
our theoretical model which is, as indicated, presented in the appendix.
1.4.2 Case Selection
Our sample of potential and real host countries follows the World Bank (2000) country
listing and consists of sovereign nation states that are sufficiently populated. According
to Singer & Small (1982), we use reasonable thresholds of one million inhabitants and
EU membership for our country sample not leaving aside the three small European states
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. 153 states thus remain for our quantitative analysis.
As we evaluate the location decision of the three member states jointly by a cross section
design, we have a total of 459 cases for the first stage probit estimation. The second
stage OLS estimation is reduced to those cases in which a country actually hosts at least
one German, French or British institute, leaving a total number of 260 observations in
our case7.
1.4.3 First-stage and second-stage dependent variables
The dependent variable for the first-step of the location decision is institute. This binary
variable indicates whether a country hosts a cultural institute (=1) or not (=0) (Goethe-
Institut Inter Nationes (2001a), British Council (2002a), Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res
(2002a). Once host countries have been chosen, the institutes decide in a second step how
many staff members they should send to a host country. Our second stage dependent
variable staff accordingly counts the total number of employees including local staff
for those and only those countries which host a cultural institute8. In correspondence
7The British Council counted 103, the Institut Franc¸ais 81 and the Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes
76 institutes in 2002.
8The BC has drastically reduced its staff in some African countries (e.g. Kenya and Cameroon)
during the period of investigation. Since the BC does not possess comprehensive statistics on the
geographical allocation of its workforce, we had to utilise staff numbers of different years between 1998
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with the estimation approach detailed in the appendix, staff enters our regression in a
log form. A more exact measure to assess the strategic importance of a host country
would be the respective country budgets of the three cultural institutes. However, it
was impossible to obtain such data upon request of the respective institutes. Further,
lacking data for a dynamic panel investigation and trying to avoid time bias as much as
possible, we have averaged our independent variables over three to five available years
within 1990-2000. Using data averages over a three to five year period, we also account
for strategic planning horizons of the institutes, which usually take a minimum of two
years9.
1.4.4 The first- and second-step independent variables
Table 1.2 below overviews the first- and second-step independent variables. It also indi-
cates the expected relationship between the independent and the dependent variable.
We measure bilateral trade dependency straightforwardly through the total amount
of bilateral exports and imports between the home and the possible host countries. For
our analysis we have averaged the IMF statistics for 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. The
more a sender country trades with a possible host country, the more likely a cultural
institute will be established. In accordance with economic gravity models we additionally
account for colonial ties as described below10.
As a proxy for the political interests of a sender country, we use the affinity measure
and 2002 instead to reduce missing data on the dependent variable. We apply the total number of BC
staff of the most recent year. However, for a few host countries we had to deal with staff data differing
drastically between 1998 and 2002. Since our analysis does not account for dynamic effects, we use
averages in these few cases. Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes (2001a); The British Council Headquarters
provided us with staff numbers for the period from 1998 to 2002. Information on the Institut Franc¸ais
was received from the Bureau des e´tablissements culturels et des alliances franc¸aises of the Ministe`re
des Affaires e´trange`res.
9Interview with the British Council Headquarters and Email correspondence with the “Evaluations-
und Strategieabteilung” of the GI.
10We further considered adding a geographic distance measure. We opted, however, against the latter
as our ‘sender’ countries’ capitals themselves are situated rather close to each other. This makes us
expect no significant variation in measuring the distance between for instance London-New-Zealand or
Paris- New-Zealand from the beginning.
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Independent variable Expected effects Operationalization of independent variable Data source
Trade
TRADE (t), logged + (1st step only) Bilateral imports + bilateral exports in mio.
$ averaged over 1994/1996/1998/2000
International Monetary Fund
(2001)
Geopolitical interests
AFFINITY (s)∗ + (1st step only) Interest Similarity of dyads in UN voting
Sun3cat=3 category United Nations voting
data (1= yes, 2= abstain, 3= no) averaged
over 1991-1995
Gartzke & Jo (2002)
Human capital
EDUCATION (h) + (1st and 2nd
step)
Tertiary school enrollment % gross averaged
1994-1997
World Bank (2000), CIA (2002)
Democracy
POLITY (d) + (1st and 2nd
step)
Democracy scores (0-10) DEMOC Autoc-
racy scores (-10-0) Autoc Polity = DEMOC
- Autoc of 1995 or averaged 1993-1998 if ma-
jor cut or regime change during that time
period
Polity 98d version of Jaggers &
Gurr (1996)
Country exclusiveness
TOURISM (a), logged + (2st step only) Tourist arrivals by region of origin (Europe)
averaged over 1994, 1996, 1998
World Tourist Organization (2000)
Status of development
GDPPC, logged +/– GDP per capita purchasing power parities
in current international US $ averaged 1994-
1998
World Bank (2000)
Country size
POP, logged + Total number of population averaged 1994-
1998
World Bank (2000)
Colonial ties
COLONY + Dummy Variable 1= former French, German
or British Colony and 0= none
Fischer Weltalmanach (2001)
Official language
LANGUAGE + Dummy Variable 1= the respective home
countries official language (English, French,
German) has official status, 0= no official
status
Gunnemark (1991)
Table 1.2: Operationalisation of main independent variables; Note: Index- and percent-
age variables remain unlogged for interpretation in elasticities is already accounted for.
For TOURISM, collusion model:
∂staff lniF
∂aiF
>
∂staff lniG
∂aiG
>
∂staff lniUK
∂aiUK
autonomy model:
∂staff lniF
∂aiF
<
∂staff lniG
∂aiG
<
∂staff lniUK
∂aiUK
.
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of Gartzke & Jo (2002). The indicator classifies the similarity of voting in the UN general
assembly on a scale from –1 (least similar) to 1 (most similar) for all countries that are
members of the United Nations for the period 1946 to 199611. This yearly index was
constructed with the help of the “S” statistic of Signorino & Ritter (1999)12. We use the
average dyadic voting similarity of France, Germany and the UK with all UN members
between 1991 -1995 and anticipate a positive effect of affinity on the geographical allo-
cation of cultural institutes. The most commonly used data set for deriving indicators
of regime type is the polity data set of Jaggers & Gurr (1996). We employ the 1996
Polity98d version of PolityIII. The polity score ranges from –10 (strong autocracy) to
+10 (strong democracy). We apply the values of 1995 or the average over a four year
period surrounding this year if a major regime change happened13. The more democratic
a state is, the greater the chance that it hosts a cultural institute.
The percentage of third level school enrollment, education, as reported by the World
Bank, serves as an indicator for a country’s potential demand for cultural activities. We
prefer the gross percentage of tertiary school enrollment averaged for 1994-1997 over
illiteracy rates because of fewer missing values and because we perceive the institutes to
try to reach the educational elites rather than the masses within a host country. As far
as possible, we have filled in missing data with the percentages given in the CIA World
Fact Book 2002. Another indicator for human capital could be the number of English,
German and French speakers in the potential host country. Although we would have
liked to count the number of English, German and French speakers within a potential
host country, it was impossible to obtain such data.14 The dummy variable language,
which accounts for a country with English, French or German as an official language, is
11Since Switzerland only became a member of the UN in 2002, we coded it the same way as Austria
corresponding to its geographical location and size.
12S = 1-(2d/dmax) where d = sum of metric distances between votes by dyad members in a given
year and dmax is the largest possible metric distance for those votes.
13Indications of a regime change are dramatic changes in the signs and values of the Polity variable.
Also, the data set lists interruptions, interregnum periods and transitions.
14As e.g. the Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res (2000) or Graddol (1997). Firstly, data sources use
varying definitions of foreign language speakers, rendering comparisons almost impossible Garry &
Rubino (2001, xii). Secondly, statistics on language speakers are published only for geographical regions
but not per country as it would be needed for this analysis.
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the alternative indicator for the specific demand for the services from a particular foreign
cultural institute. Tourism is added to the second step regression as indicator for the
attractiveness of a potential host country. We measure the total number of European
tourist arrivals per year averaged over 1994, 1996 and 1998 from the data presented by the
World Tourism Organization. Supposing that tourists prefer countries with a pleasant
climate, unique natural attractions, interesting cultures and cosmopolitan areas, tourist
arrivals seem a reasonable estimator for a country’s attractiveness. We anticipate a
positive overall effect of tourism on the location of staff members. It remains to be
tested in our comparative specifications whether more or less autonomous agents exert
greater discretionary influence on the allocation of staff.
1.4.5 Control variables
In accordance with the literature on foreign aid and the study by Schneider & Schiller
(2000) we further control for the population size, the economic development of a country
and the existence of special historical ties of the host to the sender country. We have used
the World Development Indicators to obtain data on population size and have averaged
the total population size pop for the period from 1994 to 1998. Moreover, we add GDP
per capita gdppc as common measure for a country’s level of development. In accordance
with Schneider & Schiller (2000), we could assume a positive effect on the geographical
allocation of cultural institutes. However, another important aspect for the size of a
cultural institute could be the housing costs and local wages. One could therefore expect
countries with lower living standards to host more institutes and more staff. Accordingly,
a negative coefficient of gdppc could also be explained.
To control for special historical ties between the former colonial powers and their
colonies we add a dummy variable, colony, for former British, German and French
colonies. We expect a positive effect of colony on the allocation of cultural institutes.
1.5 Empirical results
This section examines our comparative hypotheses H1 and H2. The “collusion model”
maintains that the least autonomous institute should be most pronouncedly influenced
29
by the attractiveness of a country as working place for its employees. The “autonomy
model” claims the opposite. As we have indicated, the three countries are setting different
geographic priorities in their foreign cultural diplomacy.
We will first present the estimation of the overall cross-sectional Heckman regres-
sions in Table 1.3. Table 1.4 then displays the comparative results for the cross-section
Heckman models with individually free parameters for the UK, Germany and France.
We have used the two-step Heckman estimator, as maximum likelihood is inconsistent
if some part of the specified distribution is misspecified (Wooldridge (2002)) 15. Two
different models test the competing hypotheses and evaluate the location policies of the
three largest European cultural institutes. While the “autocrat models” serve to esti-
mate the effects of the anticipated “official” cultural and political-economic interests,
the “discretion models” also take the explanatory power of our discretionary interest
variable tourism into account. This allows us to test the “collusion” and “autonomy”
hypotheses. To control the robustness of the findings we add to both basic regression
models the control variables in two different specifications. If not stated otherwise we
will base the discussion of our results on the fully specified third model columns.
As Table 1.3 shows, the model fit for all specifications as expressed by the Wald
test is reasonably high. This confirms our conception of the allocation of institutes
and personnel as a two-step decision making process. The selection parameter Mill’s
lambda turns out statistically significant at the 1%-level and with the expected negative
sign (Heckman (1979)) for all models except when logged population size is added to
the basic specification16. This implies that the selection of the remaining 251 cases
included in the 2nd step sample takes place as theoretically expected. The first-stage
governmental and cultural variables seem to exert a notable influence on the allocation
15It should also be noted that we opted against a partial maximum likelihood estimation which would
be more efficient than two-step under joint normality. The drawbacks of this approach are a lack of
robustness and convergence problems (Wooldridge 2002: 566).
16In order to test the selection effect in these particular model specifications with more power, see
Brandt & Schneider (2005) respectively, we have conducted likelihood-ratio tests of the corresponding
Maximum-Likelihood-Heckman estimations against the null hypotheses of independent OLS and probit
equations. Our composite Heckman models turned out statistically significant at a 1% level for values
of 39.71 (1df, 3rd overall Discretion-model) and 37.66 (1df, 3rd comparative Discretion-model).
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staff2cultln auto1 auto2 auto3 pa1 pa2 pa3
polity -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.024 * -0.019 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
education -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 ** -0.005 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
language -0.435 ** -0.112 -0.283 -0.018
(0.193) (0.185) (0.195) (0.190)
gdppcln -0.061 0.072 -0.233 ** -0.090
(0.112) (0.102) (0.111) (0.106)
popln 0.256 *** 0.228 ***
(0.057) (0.055)
tourismln 0.143 *** 0.180 *** 0.160 ***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
cons 4.236 *** 4.675 *** -1.126 2.259 *** 3.648 *** -1.451
(0.223) (0.915) (1.514) (0.645) (0.953) (1.516)
cult4cat
tradeln 0.395 *** 0.506 *** 0.470 *** 0.416 *** 0.519 *** 0.490 ***
(0.043) (0.056) (0.078) (0.045) (0.057) (0.079)
affinity -0.518 * -0.388 -0.319 -0.560 * -0.413 -0.356
(0.293) (0.301) (0.319) (0.299) (0.306) (0.325)
polity -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
education 0.002 0.017 *** 0.016 ** -0.001 0.014 ** 0.013 *
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
colony 0.965 *** 1.022 *** 0.953 *** 0.998 ***
(0.314) (0.324) (0.318) (0.328)
gdppcln -0.454 *** -0.388 ** -0.428 *** -0.375 **
(0.122) (0.158) (0.123) (0.159)
popln 0.052 0.042
(0.080) (0.081)
cons -1.855 *** 0.804 -0.395 -1.964 *** 0.537 -0.430
(0.247) (0.786) (2.001) (0.253) (0.794) (2.018)
mills lambda -1.383 *** -1.282 *** -0.610 ** -0.944 *** -1.002 *** -0.432 *
(0.235) (0.215) (0.243) (0.243) (0.217) (0.246)
N 434 434 434 425 425 425
censored/uncensored obs 183/251 183/251 183/251 183/242 183/242 183/242
Wald chi2 5.226 23.181 *** 45.423 *** 15.899 ** 38.353 *** 58.650 ***
prob>chi2 (0.265) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 1.3: Pooled cross-section Heckman estimations; Note: Displayed are estimated
coefficients; asterisks (***, **, *) indicate significance at the usual 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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of staff in the second step of the location decision. Turning to the estimated coefficients
of the pooled model, economic interdependence between the “sender” and the “host”
countries apparently plays a major role for the location of cultural institutes. In each
specification, the probability for an institute in country i rises significantly with the
amount of bilateral trade. Transforming the displayed probit coefficients into changes
in the probability for an institute we find that a one-percent-increase in trade fosters
the chance for an institute by about 12 percentage points17. Yet, the cultural variables
also exert some influence. This is particularly the case for the amount of people with
tertiary education which influences the probability of hosting an institute positively and
significantly in the 2nd and 3rd model specifications. However, the actual effect sizes of
education appear quite small as a 1%-increase in the portion of highly educated people is
followed by an increase of 0.4 percentage points in the chance for hosting an institute. As
we can expect from the literature on foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar (2000), Zanger (2000)),
colonial ties (colony) importantly affect the probability that one of the three sender states
sets up a cultural institute. A discrete change from 0 to 1 colony elevates the risk for
hosting a satellite by 29 percentage points. Interestingly, less developed countries seem
to have a greater chance of obtaining a British, French or German cultural institute.
However, the transformed effect size is rather small as a one-unit-growth in the logged
GDP per capita, which corresponds to a jump of 2000 US dollars from a GDP per capita
of 1000 to 3000, merely increases the risk of not hosting an institute by a factor of 0.09.
Countries with a large population also receive more staff appointed to their institutes as
popln turns out to have a highly significant impact in each model. A growth rate of 1%
in population size increases the number of allocated staff by 22-25 % according to our
3rd specification of the discretion model. The results strongly support our theoretical
propositions. In line with our argument on agent discretion, institutes seem to allocate
their staff according to other criteria besides those that their official cultural missions
would imply. The more demanded a host country as a tourist destination is, the larger
the number of staff members sent to it. The logged tourism variable appears positive
and statistically highly significant throughout all model specifications. An increase of
17For an interpretation comparable to the linear probability model estimates we multiplied the es-
timated probit coefficients with a scaling factor of 0.25 which we received by evaluating the normal
probability density function at the independent variables’ means (see Wooldridge (2002, p. 563))
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1% in the number of European tourists is followed by an estimated 14 to 18 %-growth
in staff numbers. This means for the average host country which attracts nearly four
billion European tourists per year that an increase of 40 000 additional guests per year
is followed by a predicted increase in staff number from 28 to 33. Interestingly, however,
the educational and political background of a country does not influence the decision of
how many staff workers it receives. Neither polity nor education play a significant role
for the location of staff and even appear to negatively influence the number of employees.
In short, the foundation of a cultural institute becomes highly likely for a relatively less-
developed country with close economic relations to the three European states, former
colonial ties with any of them and a substantial amount of highly educated people.
In line with our theory, the three cultural institutes seem to “follow the sunshine” in
their personnel policy and locate their staff preferably in large host countries that are
attractive from a tourist point of view.
The evaluation of H1 and H2 requires that we additionally look at the relative differ-
ences between the three sender states in their allocations of personnel and their selections
of host countries. To this end, we present additional cross-section Heckman models in
Table 1.4 and introduce interaction effects of the theoretically interesting independent
variables with country dummies for Germany and France18. The estimated isolated con-
ditional effects for the German and French interactions can be interpreted as deviations
from the slope of the base country variable which is the United Kingdom in our appli-
cation. This allows us deriving the statistical significance of the German and French
deviations directly from the z-statistics. To obtain the total conditional effects one has
to add the country deviation to the base effect for each variable under consideration19.
As mentioned above, Table 1.4 provides the estimation results of the comparative “au-
tocrat” and “discretion” models with individual specific slopes. The base coefficients in
our comparative specifications thereby stand for the UK, while G and F indicate the
isolated country effects, i.e. the deviations from the base for the two other countries.
18See also Plu¨mper, Manow & Tro¨ger (2005) for a description of free parameter model applications.
19Note that for applying an ordinary fixed effects model one could alternatively split up the sample
in order to compare the conditional effects. However, in a multivariate regression model the conditional
effects of the different independent variables affect each other. Thus, we opt for isolating the conditional
effects for each independent variable.
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Each of our two models relies on the same three model specifications as the “overall”
estimation results reported in Table 1.3. As before, we will rely on the third column
models for the interpretation of the estimated coefficients if not specified otherwise.
We can test H1 and H2 in the ’pac’-model specifications of Table 1.4 displaying our
comparative “discretion” models. In line with our expectations, significant differences
exist for the degree to which the three agents are able to “follow the sunshine” in their
personnel policy. A positive deviation for France indicates in support with the “collusion
model” that the attractiveness of a country as a tourist destination matters significantly
more for the French allocation of employees than for the British one. A 1%-increase in
tourist flows would increase the British staff numbers by 16.2%, the French ones by 22%
and the German ones by 13%. Apparently, the GI is less inclined than the BC to let
such considerations matter in its decision making process, but the deviation from the
base line country is not significant. This establishes that
∂staff lniF
∂a lniF
>
∂staff lniUK
∂a lniUK
≥ ∂staff lniG
∂a lniG
.
Market oriented considerations seemingly play a greater role for more autonomous cul-
tural agents such as the BC or the GI.
Summing up the comparative estimation results, significant differences in the location
criteria of the three European cultural institutes exist. The probability for a BC office
in a host country depends more on bilateral trade relations than it does for a GI or an
IF. For the allocation of staff, differences are most striking for the influence of a host
country’s attractiveness as tourist destination. In this respect, our findings support the
“collusion model” since the French allocation of staff apparently reflects the cultural
agent’s desire to work in a nice setting more than it is the case for the British and
the German employees. Besides these, the percentage of people with tertiary education
seems to exert a negative influence on the BC’s allocation of employees but a positive
one for the IF one’s. This might indicate that France followed a more “elitist” allocation
of its staff to countries where the job of attracting people to the French culture is easier.
Accounting for the isolated country effects increases the fit of all our models to a
considerable degree, as the Wald statistics show. Again, the “discretion” models exhibit
the best model fit. As for the pooled results, the selection parameter Mill’s lambda turns
out directly significant for all specifications except for those including population size
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staff2cultln autoc1 autoc2 autoc3 pac1 pac2 pac3
polity 0.004 0.007 0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017)
polity*g -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027)
polity*f -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.036 -0.035 -0.033
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
education -0.018 *** -0.016 ** -0.013 ** -0.014 ** -0.010 -0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
education*g 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.014
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
education*f 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.028 *** 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
tourismln 0.148 *** 0.172 *** 0.162 ***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.045)
tourismln*g -0.008 -0.013 -0.033
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
tourismln*f 0.068 *** 0.064 *** 0.054 ***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
language -0.310 0.022 -0.249 0.020
(0.189) (0.176) (0.189) (0.175)
gdppcln -0.019 0.108 -0.171 * -0.024
(0.104) (0.094) (0.103) (0.097)
popln 0.293 *** 0.272 ***
(0.050) (0.049)
cons 3.962 *** 4.065 *** -2.242 * 1.767 *** 2.856 *** -2.985 **
(0.189) (0.832) (1.302) (0.646) (0.874) (1.305)
cult4cat
tradeln 0.604 *** 0.780 *** 0.725 *** 0.620 *** 0.789 *** 0.736 ***
(0.080) (0.096) (0.109) (0.081) (0.097) (0.110)
tradeln*g -0.182 * -0.149 -0.165 -0.183 * -0.153 -0.168
(0.098) (0.103) (0.106) (0.100) (0.105) (0.108)
tradeln*f -0.210 *** -0.220 *** -0.229 *** -0.216 *** -0.225 *** -0.233 ***
(0.072) (0.076) (0.077) (0.074) (0.078) (0.079)
affinity 0.640 1.186 1.264 0.449 1.066 1.144
(0.783) (0.803) (0.810) (0.802) (0.818) (0.825)
affinity*g -0.808 -1.457 -1.391 -0.632 -1.303 -1.239
(0.922) (0.952) (0.958) (0.945) (0.970) (0.976)
affinity*f 1.730 * 1.405 1.499 1.826 * 1.460 1.553
(0.963) (0.969) (0.976) (0.987) (0.988) (0.994)
polity -0.019 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
polity*g 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
polity*f -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.017
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
education 0.003 0.024 0.021 0.001 0.021 0.018
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
education*g 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.011
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
education*f -0.029 * -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
colony 0.826 ** 0.925 *** 0.818 ** 0.908 **
(0.343) (0.353) (0.348) (0.357)
gdppcln -0.656 *** -0.540 *** -0.632 *** -0.521 ***
(0.137) (0.176) (0.138) (0.177)
popln 0.094 0.090
(0.089) (0.089)
cons -2.747 *** 1.069 -1.069 -2.806 *** 0.849 -1.196
(0.339) (0.865) (2.207) (0.344) (0.872) (2.216)
mills lambda -1.127 *** -1.049 *** -0.421 ** -0.757 *** -0.825 *** -0.226
(0.203) (0.181) (0.196) (0.230) (0.194) (0.208)
N 434 434 434 425 425 425
censored/uncensored obs 183/251 183/251 183/251 183/242 183/242 183/242
Wald chi2 40.942 *** 62.034 *** 105.033 *** 70.134 *** 94.736 *** 141.055 ***
prob>chi2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 1.4: Comparative cross-section Heckman estimations; Notes: g and f indicate
country dummies for Germany and France; varname*g and varname*f indicate the in-
teraction between a given variable and the respective country dummy
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(popln) 20.
Looking briefly at the results for the “autocrat” model, two striking differences ap-
pear for the location criteria of the three institutes under investigation: First, for the
probability to host an institute in the first step, bilateral trade relations positively mat-
ter for all three institutes, but mostly for the BC and to a significantly smaller degree
for the IF. Interpreting the scaled effect sizes, a one-percent-increase in bilateral trade
would lift the chance for a British satellite by 22 percentage points. The probability for
a French institute would move up by 15 whereas the GI takes a middle position with
an increase of 17 percentage points differing however insignificantly from the BC. Thus,
comparing the partial effects of trade, we have established that
∂staff lniG
∂t lniG
≤ ∂staff lniUK
∂t lniUK
>
∂staff lniF
∂t lniF
.
Second, with regard to the allocation of staff, education seems to exert a negative in-
fluence for the BC’s location of employees, but a significantly positive one for the IF’s.
However, the actual effects are quite small for the average country. According to our
estimations, a ten percent increase in the size of the educational elite of a host country
would lead to a decrease of 13 percentage points in British staff, whereas the French ones
would increase by 15 percentage points. Again, the GI is slightly closer to the BC as an
insignificant German deviation coefficient reveals. Following this,
∂staff lniF
∂hiF
>
∂staff lniG
∂hiG
≥ ∂staff lniUK
∂hiUK
.
The behavior of the three institutes does not differ significantly with regard to the
remaining cultural and governmental variables.
1.6 Conclusion
This article evaluated two opposing arguments on the effect of agent discretion on cultural
diplomacy. It has shown that the “collusion model” explains the allocation of personnel
to host countries of foreign cultural institutes much better than the “autonomy model”.
20As for the ‘overall’ cross-sections above, the likelihood-ratio test of independent equations for the
equivalent maximum-likelihood-Heckman estimations supports our composite Heckman model at a 1%
level of significance (see Brandt & Schneider (2005)).
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We were able to demonstrate that the least autonomous foreign cultural institute, the
IF, is more influenced by tourist considerations than its German or British counterparts.
Our results confirm that foreign cultural institutes should not be analyzed, as it is
typically the case in the political science literature, like agents that strive to maximize
ideological goals as stated in their “official missions”. They rather resemble private
contractors who are able to garner rents as a consequence of asymmetric information
(e.g. Niskanen(1968, 1971), Laffont (2000)). Our “collusion” model assumes that the
interests of the respective ministerial bureaus coincide with the preferences of the IF to
send its staff members to countries with a pleasant atmosphere. This collusion is not
possible for the largely independent BC whose financial fate is much more determined
by the demand for language courses and cultural activities.
From a theoretical perspective, our findings suggest dividing cultural institutes into
two groups for future research. Institutes with no formal autonomy, such as the IF, might
best allow for collusive behavior among bureaucrats and accordingly be analysed within
a collusion theory framework. For investigations of institutes with a minimum degree
of organisational autonomy, such as the GI and the BC in our case, a principal-agent
framework appears to be more suitable. Whether collusive or principal-agent relations
are less prone to agent discretion could be worth exploring in more detail.
In correspondence with our expectation we have further established that the foreign
services do not respect their own wish to honor “good governance” in possible host
countries. The democratic record of a state does not influence the decision to set up an
institute for the three sender countries under examination. We have, by contrast, firmly
demonstrated that this first decision is largely a consequence of economic interests and
in particular trade interdependence. Former colonies have a higher chance to receive a
cultural institute, while smaller and rich countries are somehow discriminated.
For the question of European integration in the field of foreign cultural policy, further
research is needed to analyse whether foreign cultural institutes rather compete or co-
operate when locating their satellites. So far, our results might stimulate the foreign
ministries of these three states to make the location policies of their cultural diplomacy
more coherent and transparent. As our study shows, the self-interest of rent-seeking
bureaucrats appears to be of considerable importance in this policy domain.
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1.A The formal derivation of the two-step Heckman
estimator
1.A.1 The two-step location decision on the allocation of cul-
tural institutes:
First, the government and the cultural institute of country j together decide on whether
to build a cultural institute in country i or not. Specifically, we assume that the gov-
ernment is primarily interested in economic (t) and political issues (s) when deciding
whether a country should be subject to cultural diplomacy or not. The government’s
decision is based on the utility function:
ug(t, s) = t
αsχ for α, χ ∈ [0; 1] (1.1)
where t represents trade and s political issues. The cultural institute’s priorities are with
democracy (d) and human capital (h) of country i. This leads to the following utility
function for the cultural institute as reflected in their official missions:
uc(d, h) = d
δhκ for δ, κ ∈ [0; 1] (1.2)
where d stands for democracy and h for human capital.
We assess the overall probability for country i to host a cultural institute by the
product of the institute’s and the government’s preferences. The first-step selection
estimation equation in our statistical model thus can be derived from the following
overall utility function given the cultural agent is not fully independent:
U(d, h, t, s) = (tαsχ) · (dδhκ) (1.3)
In (1.3), we perceive the decision to “enter” into a host country as a joint one between
the government and the cultural institute. The multiplicative form may be interpreted
as a veto possibility for either one of the involved actors in the case their interests are
not at all fulfilled. The overall utility for an institute in country i then diminishes to
zero.
In a second step of the location decision, the cultural institutes aim to maximize
their “unofficial” utility approximated by their size of staff allocated to a country i. We
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thereby propose the cultural agents to not only follow the criteria reflecting their official
mission (d, h), but also to “follow the sunshine” when allocating their staff, as reflected
by the variable tourist attractiveness (a) in (1.4):
ua(d, h, a) = d
δhκaµ for δ, κ, µ ∈ [0, 1] (1.4)
where d = democracy, h = human capital and a = tourist attractiveness. According to
the “autonomy model”, the greater the degree of autonomy from the respective govern-
ment, the greater is the estimated µ. The opposite relationship holds for the “collusion
model”.
1.A.2 The Heckman estimation: First-step selection model
The two-step character of the Heckman estimator fits our theoretical model nicely. To
account for non-random selection in our 2nd-step country sample, the following selec-
tion equation determines the probability for our 2nd-step dependent variable y2ij to be
observed:
z∗ij = w
′
ijγ + 1ij (1.5)
where i = 1, ..., n (n = 153, all countries with more than one million inhabitants or
with the status of EU membership) and j = {uk, g, f} for the three countries under
investigation, z∗ij is the latent dependent variable for the selection equation, and w
′
ij
denotes the vector of the first-step independent variables. γ comprises the first-step
estimation coefficients and 1ij the error term of the selection equation.
We assume the number of observed staff to depend on the joint decision to build an
institute in country i in the first place. We thus derive the 1st-step-selection-equation
from the formulated overall utility in (1.3) adding a disturbance term eij , such that
Uij = ugij(t, s) · ucij(d, h) · e1ij (1.6)
and by taking logarithms:
logUij = log ugij + log ucij + 1ij
where
log ugij = αj log tij + χj log sij
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and
log ucij = δj log dij + κj log hij.
Based on this, we arrive at expression (1.7) for the latent variable in our 1st-step esti-
mation model:
z∗ij = logUij = αj log tij + χj log sij + δj log dij + κj log hij + µj log aij + 1ij (1.7)
The observed binary variable zij is defined as
zij =
 1, forz∗ij > 00, otherwise.
1.A.3 Second-step estimation model
With regard to the number of employees per host country i as our 2nd-step dependent
variable, we can generally formulate the 2nd-step regression equation as:
y2ij = x
′
ijβ + 2ij (1.8)
where y2ij defines the observed continuous dependent variable for our estimation equa-
tion. x′ij stands for the vector of the main cultural independent variables (d, h) including
a for the tourist attractiveness of country i and a constant term. β defines the vector of
coefficients to be estimated and 2ij stands for the error term of the second-step regres-
sion. By assumption, the 1st- and 2nd-step errors 1ij and 2ij follow a bivariate Gaussian
distribution with zero means and correlation ρ. σ1 is normalised to 1: 2ij
1ij
 ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
 .
Knowing that y2ij is observed only when z
∗
ij > 0, that is zij = 1 for our binary dependent
variable, this is when w′ijγ > 1ij, we can write the conditional expectation of y2ij on
being observed, that is, y2ij conditional on z
∗
ij > 0. Thus we formulate the conditional
expectation as,
E(y2ij | zij = 1, x′ijβ) = E(x′ijβ + 2ij | w′ijγ + 1ij ≥ 0)
= E(y2ij | 1ij > −w′ijγ)
= x′ijβ + E(2ij | 1ij > −w′ijγ). (1.9)
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And from the moments of a censored bivariate Gaussian distribution this is
E(y2ij | 1ij > −w′ijγ) = x′ijβ + ρσ1
φ(w′ijγ)
Φ(w′ijγ)
(1.10)
where φ = pdf,Φ = CDF of a normal random variable. We can thus generally write our
2nd -step statistical model including the selection correction term as:
(y2ij | zij = 1) = x′ijβ + λ′ijβλ + vij with ρσ1 = βλ (1.11)
the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratios λ′ij which are based on the 1
st-step observations
and account for the non-random selection bias in the 2nd-step regression.
Regarding the number of the cultural institute’s staff as the dependent variable y2ij,
we arrive at
(y2ij | zij = 1) = δj log dij + κj log hij + µj log a+ βλλˆij + vij (1.12)
as our 2nd-step estimation model adding a disturbance term e2ij and the estimated
inverse Mill’s ratios λˆij to (1.4) and taking logarithms.
1.A.4 Estimation procedure
The coefficients of the 1st- and 2nd step independent variables can be estimated following
the standard two-step Heckman (1979) estimation procedure. Accordingly, we estimate
the selection equation defined as the overall probability for a cultural institute in country
i by the usual probit model:
Pr(zij = 1 | w′ijγ) = Φ(w′ijγ | σ1) (1.13)
where
z∗ij = logUij,
observed when zij = cult4cat = 1, and
w′ijγ = αj log tij + χj log sij + δj log dij + κj log hij + c1
where c1 is a constant term.
The coefficients of the 2nd-step selection-corrected statistical model then are estimated
via OLS:
(y2ij | zij = 1) = x′ijβ + λˆ′ijβλ + vij (1.14)
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where
y2ij = log ucij
and
x′ijβ = δj log dij + κj log hij + µj log aij + c2.
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Chapter 2
What actually happens to EU
directives in the member states? A
cross-country cross-sector view on
national transposition instruments1
‘Because of belated implementation of European directives for functioning electricity-
and gas markets, the Commission actually took half a dozen infringement procedures
before the European Court of Justice – Spain, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal and
Luxembourg are sued. What is lacking is a joint strategy of the Commission and the
national governments. [. . . ] But when the EU-Commissioner for energy matters, Andris
Piebalgs, travels through the capitals in order to promote all the directives, proposals and
green books by which the Commission aimed to prevent the growing dependence on only a
few suppliers, he only raises a laugh. What has been decided upon in Brussels, is ignored,
circumvented or delayed in the member states.’
Translated from DIE ZEIT, No. 10, March 2, 2006: 23
1This chapter has been published as CESifo Working Paper 2098. Earlier versions have been pre-
sented at the BGSE Macro/Finance/Public Finance and the Econometric Seminar of the University of
Bonn, the ECPR Third-Pan European Conference on EU politics 2006 in Istanbul, the 5th Workshop
of the DFG Priority Programme 1142 on ‘Federalism: Theory and Empirical Evidence’ in Dresden, and
the CESifo Venice Summer Institute 2007 on ‘Reinventing Europe’.
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2.1 Introduction
European integration does not only depend on the European Union’s (EU) decision-
making ability but also on the correct, complete and timely implementation of EU-
decisions in the member states. The latter aspect of putting EU-law into national practice
is all the more relevant as legislative activity in the EU is marked by a clear centralizing
trend over the last decade. Today, EU decision-making touches almost every policy area
and EU legislative activity amounts to more than 15 000 binding European acts in force2.
This throws up such important questions as the following: What happens to this bulk
of EU legislation in the member states?
At first sight, this issue might appear trivial and self-explanatory as member states
have legally obliged themselves to transpose and implement EU directives in a complete,
correct and timely manner according to articles 249, III and 10, I of the EC Treaty (ECT).
However, national implementation practices reveal a different picture as the above quote
by Commission president Jose´ Manuel Barroso’s spokesperson illustrates.
Given the discrepancy between implementation theory and reality, our paper tries to
shed empirical light on the actual implementation patterns across member states and
policy areas. We thereby focus on EU directives only. Compared to other types of sec-
ondary, that is non-Treaty, EU law such as regulations or decisions, the implementation
procedure for EU directives differs in that EU directives first need to be transposed, i.e.
transcribed into national legislation, before they are legally effective and can be put into
practice by national administrations, courts and agencies. Regarding their transposition,
member states may choose from an array of national legal instrument(s) as long as the
respective legal device(s) serve(s) to fulfill the directive’s general objectives and meet(s)
the required deadline. One can thereby broadly distinguish between primary and sec-
ondary national transposition devices. Primary transposition instrument(s) refer to all
national legal devices requiring a parliamentary majority decision. Secondary transpo-
sition devices comprise all other national legal instruments, usually mere administrative
acts.
2See Alesina, Angeloni & Schuknecht (2005, Tables 4, 7) on the total number of passed regulations,
directives and decisions per period and the total number of these types of legislation in force between
1971 and 2000.
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According to this set up, we conceive the government’s transposition decision as two-
fold: First, the government may decide whether it is generally willing to transpose a
particular directive or not. Assuming a government’s willingness to transpose, the ques-
tion then becomes whether to transpose via primary or secondary legislative devices, i.e.
whether to get involved into a national parliamentary debate or not. This second part
of the government’s transposition decision is exactly what our paper aims to analyse.
In particular, we intend to investigate the de facto ratios of primary to total transposi-
tion notifications for EU directives adopted between the Single European Act and today.
This question is highly relevant from a normative political point of view and comple-
ments the debate on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ by investigating in how far national
parliaments are excluded from the legislative process when it comes to the transposition
of EU directives?
For our empirical assessment, we have constructed a unique dataset comprising
political-economic indicators and various measures of transposition based on the member
states’ notifications of transposed EU-legislation, as provided in CELEX Sector 7 by the
European Commission. Our dataset not only covers the EU-15 member states on an
aggregate level but also six major sectors of their economies and it ranges from 1986 to
2002. This allows us to investigate the member states’ transposition performances in a
novel fashion, namely with a dynamic cross-country cross-sector view. The sector per-
spective thereby allows us to consider the specific content of a directive, i.e. the policy
area it touches upon, as an additional explanatory factor besides the frequently hypoth-
esised macro-level politico-institutional and economic effects. We find that three factors
matter for explaining primary transposition ratios: political-institutional constellations,
sector characteristics and EU-membership benefits. In particular, governmental control
of the parliamentary agenda and net EU receipts have a negative effect on the ratio of
primary to total transpositions. Economic sector size seems to play a positive significant
role for primary transposition ratios. However, the direction of the effect changes when
we control for other sector characteristics, i.e. sector lobbying potential and technicality.
The following is divided into six parts: After a brief discussion of the relevant liter-
ature in section 2, we discuss our theoretical approach in section 3. Here, we define the
broader theoretical framework. With a view to modeling the transposition of EU direc-
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tives, we outline the implementation process for the case of EU directives and specify
the government’s decision path after it has received the directives coming from Brus-
sels. Based on national governments’ utilities we derive testable hypotheses about the
expected ratios of primary to total transposed directives across member states and pol-
icy areas. Section 4 draws up our research design. Starting with discussing our data
structure, we explain our choice of policy areas before turning to descriptive figures of
our dependent variable and describe our econometric model and method. Finally, we
present our empirical results in section 5 and summarize our main conclusions in section
6.
2.2 Related literature
Two strands of the political science literature deal with the transposition and implemen-
tation of EU directives, i.e. the issues of Europeanization and compliance, respectively.
Europeanization is thereby defined as ‘the process of influence deriving from European
decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative struc-
tures’ (He´ritier (1995)). Compliance generally refers to the fulfillment of EU legislation
in the member states.
So far, comparative studies using econometric tools in the area of Europeanization
mainly concentrate on the timeliness of transposing EU directives. Prominent exam-
ples are Mastenbroek (2003), Kaeding (2005) and Ko¨nig, Luetgert & Ma¨der (2005) who
investigate the political-economic factors underlying transposition delays from different
perspectives. Whereas Mastenbroek (2003) focuses on Dutch transposition delays for 229
directives enacted between 1995 and 1998 using various data sources mainly provided
by the Dutch government, Kaeding (2005) concentrates on one particular policy area
(transport). He particularly analyses the probability of delay across five member states,
namely Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK and Greece. In contrast to Masten-
broek (2003), data in Kaeding (2005) stems from the EU Commission’s online-database
CELEX. It contains the transposition deficit for all 106 directives of the transport acquis
ranging from 1957 to 2004. The analyses of survival- and cross-section logit models of
Mastenbroek (2003) and Kaeding (2005) both show that EU-level factors such as the
time remaining until the transposition deadline, the initiating EU institution or the ap-
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plied EU decision-making procedure, influence the timing of transposition. The study of
Kaeding (2005) further reveals that a directive’s overall level of complexity and the over-
all amount of EU legislation waiting for transposition both significantly and positively
affect delay. With respect to national factors of influence, both authors demonstrate that
it is the type of legal instrument used (i.e. law, decree, regulation or circulair) rather
than the number of reported transposition instruments which significantly influences
transposition delay. However, whereas Mastenbroek (2003) finds a strong effect of the
ministry in charge, Kaeding (2005) does not. Additionally, in Kaeding’s (2005) analysis
the number of governmental coalition parties plays a significant role for the likelihood
of timely transposition. Ko¨nig et al. (2005) also employ CELEX-based data for their
empirical investigation of the timeliness of transposition. Compared to Kaeding (2005),
however, they apply a more comprehensive approach as their dataset contains not only
transport directives, but all 1,592 directives adopted between 1984 and 2002 with the re-
spective transposition measures for the fifteen ‘old’ EU member states. Rather than just
looking at a selection of particular member states they look at all EU-15 member states.
Moreover, they explore sector differences in transposition timing across four CELEX
policy areas, namely agriculture, energy and environment, internal market and common
rules. Apart from Mastenbroek (2003) and Kaeding (2005), they also include EU-level
and national-level economic factors, such as the amount of net-EU payments and value
added shares. They further incorporate preference measures grasping the level of conflict
on the EU- and the national stage, such as the ‘sector specific core based on maximum
distance between member state governments’ and the ‘sector specific core based on the
maximum distance between parties represented in national parliaments’. The results of
their preliminary Heckman selection (probit-probit) model reveal that EU-level conflict
influences negatively while national conflict positively influences the probability to trans-
pose in the selection equation. The probability of delayed transposition in the second
step of the Heckman procedure is positively and significantly affected by the number of
notified transposition measures, net-EU receipts and sector value added shares. Besides
these, Ko¨nig et al. (2005) find out that more pluralist systems lead to a significantly
higher probability for delayed transposition.
The compliance literature, deals with infringement procedures initiated by the Com-
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mission and litigated in co-operation with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against
member states failing to implement or ‘to comply’ with EU-law. Thus, compliance stud-
ies address similar research questions as found in the Europeanization literature, but
use a different dependent variable for measuring national performances of coping with
EU-law. Instead of relying on member state transposition notifications, quantitative
compliance studies count member states’ expositions to EU infringement procedures.
Two especially relevant examples of applied quantitative work within this strand of lit-
erature are Bo¨rzel, Hofmann & Panke (2005) and Perkins & Neumayer (2007). Bo¨rzel
et al. (2005) test two competing hypotheses about national non-compliance. On the
one hand, the ‘management theory hypothesis’ supposes non-compliance to be involun-
tary and mainly due to the lacking capacity (i.e. administrative resources and public
support) of a member state. The ‘enforcement theory hypothesis’ assumes national non-
compliance to be fully intended. In particular, the voting power of a member state vis a`
vis the EU-institutions is assumed to be the dominant factor underlying a government’s
motivation to comply. Their probit- and survival-analyses uncover that both anticipated
factors are statistically relevant for explaining cross-country variances of non-compliance.
Like Ko¨nig et al. (2005), Bo¨rzel et al. (2005) further control for policy-specific effects and
also find strong empirical evidence for their explanatory power. However, Bo¨rzel et al.
(2005) are so far unable to identify exactly which policy-related aspects are at work.
Perkins & Neumayer (2007) follow a theoretically different approach which follows
a similar view as we do. In contrast to previous works in the compliance literature,
the authors take on a political-economic perspective assessing the benefits of compliance
for a member state. Applying negative binomial estimations for their count dependent
variable, i.e. the number of national expositions to infringement procedures, Perkins
& Neumayer (2007) find overall support for their main argument that national levels of
compliance are influenced by the benefits a particular member state derives from the EU,
both politically and economically. In particular, the level of intra-EU trade dependence
as well as well as per capita voting power in EU institutions are negatively correlated
with legal infringements. Surprisingly, but in line with Ko¨nig et al. (2005), Perkins &
Neumayer (2007) find a member state’s compliance record to decrease with rising net-EU
receipts.
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Besides recent advances, what lacks so far in both discussed literature strands, is
quantitative empirical work on the type of legal transposition instrument(s) used by the
national governments. The aforementioned papers of Kaeding (2005) and Mastenbroek
(2003) merely point to the effect of the legal instrument used on transposition delay.
We ask, however, directly what political-economic factors may make a government opt
for primary transposition devices given it is willing to transpose. Although neglected
in the literature so far, this question seems highly relevant from a normative political
point of view. First, the national balance of power could be threatened if, through
the process of EU-law transposition, member state executives would administer more
and more legislative competences to the cost of national parliaments. This would be
the case if national executives would preferably choose secondary transposition devices
for a generally increasing number of EU directives. It would be interesting to ask for
future research whether EU integration has lead to a ‘democratic deficit’ on the national
arena? However, analysing the possible effects behind a government’s chosen mode of
transposition is far beyond the scope of this paper. Our study aims to provide a first
attempt to directly address the national transposition modes, i.e. the de facto ratios of
primary to total transpositions respectively. But this is not the only contribution we
claim to make. With respect to our research design, we further try to extend on the cross-
sector perspectives addressed in Ko¨nig et al. (2005) and Bo¨rzel et al. (2005). In doing
so, we employ a three-dimensional econometric model grasping not only country- but
also sector-specific effects across five major sectors of the respective national economies.
Looking at transposition performances across policy areas thereby allows us to consider
the policy-contents of EU directives. As we suppose that both aspects, policy and polity,
play a significant role for a government’s transposition rationale, a comparative policy
design appears especially important in order to prevent selection bias.
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2.3 Towards modeling transposition
2.3.1 Theoretical set up: the government’s transposition deci-
sion
Looking at the transposition framework in greater detail, three different types of EU
legislation may be distinguished: decisions, regulations and directives. All three are
nationally binding3. However, the first two come directly into effect in the member
states without the need for any national legislation. In contrast, directives must be
transposed, that is legally translated and written into national legislation, before the
respective national administrative bodies can act upon them (see Art. 249 III ECT on
the obligation of the member states to transpose and implement directives). In the case
of non-compliance by failing either to transpose or to put EU law into practice they risk
being sent a letter of formal notice by the Commission as the “guardian of the Treaty”
(Art. 211 ECT). Member states can also be officially sentenced by the ECJ, the latter
being the last instance of the infringement procedure (Art. 226 and 228 ECT)4 Further,
member states can be held liable to the European citizens if they do not implement EU
directives on time or in an incomplete manner (Streinz (2001)).
Regarding the national legal instruments used for transposition, directives may im-
pose specific implementation conditions and objectives, but not the member states’
transposition instrument(s) directly. In other words, formally, the choice of transpo-
sition instrument(s) remains with the national governments, leaving national technical
and legal restrictions aside. In common judicial practice, however, an EU directive may
become directly applicable for a member state once the deadline for implementation has
passed and certain legal conditions are met. Yet, according to Streinz (2001, 158f), in
3Two further types of secondary EU legislation, namely recommendations and opinions, are left aside
here since they are not binding for the member states.
4According to Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber (2005) the whole infringement procedure comprises
four stages: 1. Letter of Formal Notice, 2. Reasoned Opinion, 3. Referral to the ECJ (all initiated by
Commission), and 4. Judgment by the ECJ. They also point to newer ‘internal procedure’ documents
of the Commission that even allow for additional, non-legal and more promising instruments to bring
member state behavior into line with EU law. For a detailed description of the different stages of the
infringement procedure and its effects on implementation in the member states, see Falkner et al. (2005).
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the case of delay it unfolds a so called ‘effet utile’ only if:
1. the directive is formulated in such a way that individual rights can directly be
derived from it, meaning that it does not leave any contextual discretion to the
national judicial agencies (self-executive character of a directive), and
2. the content of a directive does not harm a citizen.
In the following we will restrict ourselves to EU directives rather than to EU decisions
or regulations. This is for two reasons. First, only for the case of EU directives the issue
of transposing EU law into national legislation does arise. EU decisions and regulations
come into force directly upon their adoption on the EU level. Second, we find the
question of legal transposition instruments used by the member states to be empirically
relevant and not to be a mere theoretical artifact. As pointed out above, only under very
special judicial conditions may EU directives unfold a ‘direct effect’ in a member state.
Summing up, in this paper, our focus lies on the transposition of EU directives as
starting point of the national implementation procedure. With respect to the legal
instrument(s) used for transposition, we suppose the government (G)’s decision to be
fully intended according to Bo¨rzel et al. (2005)’s enforcement theory and to follow a two-
fold decision-path as illustrated in 2.1. First, G chooses whether it is generally willing
to transpose and implement a particular directive or whether it prefers to not transpose
at all or to delay. Then, given its transposition willingness, G has the possibility to
select the appropriate legal transposition instrument. It may thereby opt for primary or
secondary legislative devices.
According to our definition, primary legislative devices comprise all national legis-
lation in the sense of “laws”. In other words, we define primary legislation as national
legal instruments which in some way have to be approved by the respective national
parliament. All other national legislative actions that can directly be adopted by the
member states’ executives are referred to as secondary legislation.
This categorization into primary and secondary transposition instruments may ap-
pear rather broad given that the number and types of available legal instruments vary
considerably across EU member states. Refer to Ko¨nig & Ma¨der (2007) for a complete
list of national legal transposition instruments and a description of the particular national
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Figure 2.1: Two-fold transposition decision of a member government (G)
legislative processes with respect to the transposition of EU law. Their description hint
to special legislative rules some states have established for dealing with EU law. Ireland
and the UK, for instance, have done so in the European Community Acts of 1972 provid-
ing the general power for implementing Community obligations by means of secondary
legislation. Related to this, Ireland and the UK each have passed Statutory Instruments
Acts which enable their parliaments to delegate legislation to the ministry in charge. For
some of the Statutory Instruments, the British and the Irish Houses of Parliament have
preserved their rights to annul Statutory Instruments passed by the executive within
a given time frame. Thus, although the transposition of EU law via Statutory Instru-
ments require delegation by parliament, they count as secondary legislation of the UK
and Ireland as they have finally been passed by the ministry in charge.
In our dataset, we so far cannot account for these judicially unclear cases, but restrict
primary legislation to only those national legislative devices in the sense of national
‘laws’ that always require a majority decision of the lower chamber. Thus, we leave
it with the aforementioned classification as it allows for the theoretically interesting
differentiation between mere bureaucratic acts (secondary legislation) and laws that need
the approval of parliament (primary legislation) for our first attempt in assessing the
national transposition modes. For the interpretation of our descriptive and statistical
results, we do, however, keep in mind the national legal particularities as described by
Ko¨nig & Ma¨der (2007).
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2.3.2 Assessing the government’s utility: costs and benefits of
primary transposition
Transaction costs (TC)
If a government (G) goes through parliament in transposing a directive coming from
Brussels, several difficulties may lie upon its way. Obstacles to parliamentary decision-
making may thereby vary across countries and sectors, but can generally be seen as
the transaction costs (TC) of primary legislation. Do¨ring & Hallerberg (2004) refer to
two main factors determining the TC of the dynamics, i.e. the speed, of the legislative
process in their recent compendium on the passage of legislation across Western Europe.
First, country-specific institutional constraints, such as the number of veto players (vps),
make the passage of legislation by parliament costly for the government as opposition
possibilities increase. Tsebelis (1995) elaborates this effect in his frequently cited veto
player theory. Regarding transposition, a positive effect of vps on transposition delay
has so far been approved in the empirical studies of Kaeding (2005), Ko¨nig et al. (2005)
and Mastenbroek (2003). Second, Do¨ring & Hallerberg (2004) argue that as time is
scarce in parliamentary life, legislation always involves opportunity costs (OC) for re-
election seeking politicians. Thus, additional TC may arise from the ability of minorities
to inflict OC on the parliamentary majority. We will account for the ability of minority
groups to inflict OC on the government by considering sector-specific lobbing effects in
the section below. For now, let us hypothesize about the influence of vps on the legal
kind of transposition instrument(s):
H1 The greater the number of veto players within a governmental system, the less the
ratio of primary to total transposed directives. (–)
In the same volume Do¨ring (2004) further tries to link time constraint, the level of
controversy entailed in a particular bill and the government’s control of the parliamen-
tary agenda to the introduction of restrictive rules by the government. He thereby refers
to Henning (1995) and Do¨ring (1995a) who have formulated and tested a formal model
explaining legislative output across Europe. More particularly, Henning (1995) assumes
a majority government to be the monopolist of political decisions in a parliamentary
system and derives the somewhat contra-intuitive theoretical prediction that the more
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a government, due to time-saving prerogatives of agenda control, is principally able to
push many legislative measures through, the fewer, yet more controversial bills it is ac-
tually inclined to submit to parliament. Empirical tests by Do¨ring (1995a) ‘approve’ this
proposition. We agree on the notion that the power distribution in executive-legislative
relations should play a crucial role not only for explaining legislative outputs but also for
analyzing governments’ preferred transposition modes. However, intuitively and from
a TC perspective, we argue that for weaker governments the costs of transposing via
parliament are generally higher as their chances of pushing a particular bill through the
legislative process appear smaller. In particular, coalition governments encompassing a
large number of parties appear more prone to inner-executive and legislative opposition
as each party may be seen as additional veto player according to Kreppel (1997). As we
are unable to decide on the expected effect direction theoretically, our statistical analysis
will have to reveal whether the argument of Henning (1995) and Do¨ring (1995a) in H2a
holds for explaining transposition modes.
H2a The stronger G relative to the opposition, the less the ratio of primary to total
transposed directives. (–)
H2b The larger the number of coalition parties, i.e. the greater the fractionalisation of
a government coalition, the less the ratio of primary to total transposed directives.
(–)
Regarding the level of controversy entailed in a particular bill, Do¨ring (2004) argues
that for G the electoral utility of a controversial bill relative to a consensual one is higher.
Underlying this argument is a statement of Olsen (1980) that given the government can
determine the agenda it will use the parliament for those matters that it considers most
important and wishes to symbolize to the whole population. Assuming that economically
important directives are more controversial in the sense that they foster parliamentary
or inner-coalition opposition to a higher degree than less important directives thus leads
to the following hypothesis from a sector perspective on transposition mode:
H3 The greater the economic importance of a sector, the greater the ratio of primary to
total transposition. (+)
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Further, the timing of transposition within the policy cycle may play a crucial role for
the transposition mode. Generally, as shown by Do¨ring (2004), marginal costs of addi-
tional bills passing parliament tend to increase towards the end of an election period. The
raise in marginal costs depends, however, on the controversy level of a particular piece
of legislation. We accordingly hypothesize with respect to G’s preferred transposition
mode:
H4 The closer the transposition decision is to the end of an election period, the less the
ratio of primary to total transposed directives. (–)
We expect this effect to be even stronger in the case of controversial directives, i.e.
economically important directives.
Assessing the costs of primary transposition from an economic perspective, market
inefficiencies may arise if EU directives are transposed and implemented in an uncoordi-
nated way among member states. This applies to the kind of transposition instrument as
well as to uncoordinated timing or delays. With respect to timing, primary transposition
devices thus appear economically costly for a government. This may particularly be the
case for directives touching upon technical issues, which is in sectors such as transport
or environment. Thinking e.g. of the construction of a uniform railway system, a quick
and coeval harmonization across all member states would clearly bear economic advan-
tages in these areas as intra-EU trade would be facilitated. Hypothesis 5 mirrors this
proposition accordingly.
H5 In rather technical sectors, the ratio of primary to total transposed directives is
smaller. (–)
Lobbying
If an EU directive passes parliament during transposition, not only internal but also
opposition external to the law-making process increases by lobbying activities that target
parliamentary legislation. The passage of EU legislation in national parliaments offers
more time and opportunities for lobbyists to take action on EU laws on behalf of their
constituencies. Politicians then have to weigh the special interests of a minority group
against the welfare of the median voter. The ability of minority groups to inflict OC
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on politicians thereby depends on certain systemic or policy-specific features. Again, as
stated in H2b, coalition governments seem particularly vulnerable to opposition by lobby
groups as lobby costs decrease with the number of parties involved in the government
(see Grossman & Helpman (2001)). Regarding policy areas, we suppose lobby groups to
be mainly active in sectors for which interests are relatively easy to organize, meaning
sectors which are small in group size and pursue clear-cut group interests according to
the theory of Olson (1965). Thus, in addition to H2b, we hypothesize that:
H6 The more a sector is subject to lobbyism, the less EU directives are transposed via
primary transposition devices. (–)
Given the manifold political-economic costs for a government G to transpose via
parliament, it is not surprising that the overall primary transposition ratios are rather
low (see Figure 2). Yet, are there any systematic politico-economic or sector-specific
benefits for a member state that help explain the observed cross-country cross-sector
variations in primary transposition ratios?
‘Better regulation’ benefits
Better, that is more detailed and concrete, administrative instructions insert positive
microeconomic effects as they prevent strategic misuse and misinterpretation by firms.
Aware of these effects, the Commission has proposed a new better regulation package in
March 2005 in order to improve the quality of new legislation and existing rules on the
EU- as well as on the national level. It accordingly argues that “common rules across
all Member States help business and can lower costs” 5. Further, in her Communication
to the Council and the EP on the Lisbon Strategy the Commission states:
“Better regulation has a significant positive impact on the framework conditions for
economic growth, employment and productivity. By improving the quality of legislation, it
creates the right incentives for business, cutting unnecessary costs and removing obstacles
to adaptation and innovation. The measures foreseen in the ‘better regulation’ initiatives
by the Commission and the Council Presidencies need to be implemented rapidly”6.
5European Commission (2006)
6European Commission (2005, p. 7)
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Assuming primary legislation to generally be more elaborated and thus to guarantee
more precise and detailed rules relative to secondary acts, there exist clear macroeco-
nomic incentives for transposition via primary legislative devices. From a sector per-
spective, this should especially be the case in economically important or rather technical
sectors where only precise implementation rules secure the functioning of the Common
Market. Thus, H3 would further be strengthened by the better regulation argument,
but the anticipated negative effect of sector technicality in H5 would partly be offset.
Therefore, we cannot be sure about the expected effect direction in H5 for our statistical
analysis.
EU-membership benefits
A direct way to assess the economic benefits from EU membership is measuring national
fiscal transfers from the EU. Ko¨nig et al. (2005) have controlled for the effect of a coun-
try’s net EU-receipts on transposition timeliness and found a significant positive effect
on the delay probability of directives. Further, Perkins & Neumayer (2007) develop a
theoretical argument on the influence of net EU-receipts on infringement cases. However,
against their proposition, and in line with Bo¨rzel et al. (2005) they discover a positive
effect of net EU-receipts on infringement submissions. With respect to transposition
modes, we stick to Perkins & Neumayer (2007) assuming that EU fiscal transfers gen-
erally lower the costs of complying with EU law. Thus, relative to net EU-payers, we
expect primary transposition to become cheaper for net EU recipients and hypothesize
accordingly:
H7 The more fiscal transfers a member state receives from the EU, the the more EU
directives are transposed via primary legal instruments. (+)
2.4 Data structure
2.4.1 Data source and classification of policy areas
Information for our dependent variable (DV) stems from the European Commission’s
online database CELEX Sector 7. It has been extrapolated and processed by Brooke
Luetgert and Lars Ma¨der according to Ko¨nig et al. (2005). The whole DV dataset
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contains all of the 2225 adopted EU directives between 1979 and 2003 together with the
notices of all 15 EU member states to the Commission on their respective transposition
instrument(s). For this paper, we restrict our period of investigation to directives adopted
between the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 to the latest year
available, 2002 respectively. This yields 17*15*5=1275 cases for our three-dimensional
cross-country, cross-sector time series analysis.
Defining the policy areas for which we expect variations on cross-sector implementa-
tion quotas mainly requires solving a practical data problem:
In order to investigate the effects of political-economic characteristics on primary
transposition patterns from a sector perspective, we need to match the policy area clas-
sifications of our dependent and independent variables. This requires fitting the EU
policy areas defined in Appendix C of the CELEX Sector 7 database manual with the
economic sector division of the OECD STAN Indicators 2002. Table 2.4 in the appendix
demonstrates in detail how this amounts to our final classification of six policy domains.
We thereby tried to match the sector contents of the various data sources to a maximum
degree but at the same time to prevent overlaps in classes as far as possible7. For our
empirical analysis, we further had to ensure that our classification scheme comprises
a minimum number of observations of our dependent variable per sector. This is why
we leave aside some of the smaller but frequently cited sectors such as construction or
education.
Thus, turning away from technical drawbacks, our resulting sector division contains
five of the major policy areas of a national economy. Value added shares add up to
more than 95%. The aggregated sector classes still allow for the anticipated variations
in sector size and primary transposition ratios as will be demonstrated in our descriptive
analysis below. For the ease of comparison we further made our selection of policy areas
correspond to the empirical literature on EU policy-making as far as possible. Half of
our policy areas also appear in the classification scheme of Alesina et al. (2005). Beyond
this, further adjustment of the two classifications for future research is easily possible as
both categorizations are based on the CELEX Appendix C manual.
7Only in the case of classes five and six the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel could not be further separated.
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2.4.2 Dependent variable
As pointed out earlier, we strive to explain variations in national transposition instru-
ment(s) in our empirical analysis. To do so, we have categorized the various national
transposition devices into primary and secondary legislation. Now, we empirically map
the national transposition decision by taking the actual ratios of primary to total trans-
position notifications per member state i, sector j and year t as indicator for our DV
COLIij,t (= choice of legal instrument(s) in member state i and year t for directives
touching upon sector j). Table 2.5 in the appendix illustrates the construction of our DV
in detail. Underlying COLIij,t, is a directive-based measure COLIr,ijt which contains in-
formation on transposition notifications by member state i within sector j in period t for
each directive r. The aggregation of this directive-based measure to our sector-devised
DV COLIij,t proceeds in two steps:
First, we collect information from CELEX Sector 7 for each directive r on all trans-
position instruments reported by country i within sector j and year t. Based on this
information we then create the directive-based ratios of primary to total transpositions
referring to COLIr,ijt in Table 2.5. Next, we code a dummy variable COLI dr,ijt indi-
cating for each directive r if COLIr,ijt > 0, i.e. whether the transposition record of a
particular directive r includes at least one primary transposition instrument. Then, in
the second step, we aggregate (by taking the mean) the dummy counts of COLI dr,ijt
for all directives r within a given sector j of country i and year t to a single sector-based
primary to total transposition ratio, that is our DV COLIij,t. Given, for example, the
Commission has passed four directives in 1995 concerning the transport sector in mem-
ber state i. For directives 1 and 2, member state i reported only secondary transposition
instruments in 1995 or later. For directive 3, member state i reported six instruments
in 1995 or later out of which two were primary and four secondary. For directive 4, no
transposition instruments at all have been reported by member state i. Then, for the
transport sector in member state i in 1995, this would yield a primary transposition
ratio of 1/3 or 0.33 (= 0 + 0 + 1(+missing)/ [3(+missing)]) for our DV COLIij,t.
Our DV measure contains three peculiarities regarding interpretation:
First, to be precise, the numerator of our DV COLIij,t empirically refers to the
number of a member state’s transposition notifications (in a given policy area and a
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given year) which include at least one primary legislative transposition instrument, i.e.
notifications which involve at least one majority decision in parliament. The aggregation
of a directive-based transposition measure via our dummy variable COLI d becomes
necessary as member states may report various transposition instruments for a single EU
directive. Simply adding up the transposition instruments reported by member state i
in a given sector j and year t would accordingly neglect that some of these instruments
may refer to the same EU directive.
Second, by construction, a value of 1 for COLIij,t may refer to a transposition ratio
of 1/1 but also to a ratio of, for instance, 35/35. A value of zero can accordingly mean
two things for COLIij,t. For example, a ratio of 0 for Belgium implies 0 primary out of
30 notified transposition instruments in 1994 in the agriculture sector, whereas in 1987 in
the transport sector a ratio of zero for Belgium means 0 primary out of 0 notifications.
In order to distinguish between these two cases, we code ratios of 0 primary out of
0 notifications as missing values of COLIij,t. Thus, missing values on our DV may
result for two reasons: either if no directive has been adopted for a given year, country
and sector or if directives lack any transposition notifications, implying that they have
not been transposed for most cases8. Therefore, by construction, we actually cannot
separate cases missing due to transposition inactivity by a member state from cases
where nothing had to be transposed in the first place. However, for Finland, Austria
and Sweden information on COLIij,t for the years before their accessions on January 1st
1995 is clearly lacking out of the second reason. For the paper at hand, this imprecision
on interpreting missing observations appears acceptable as the overall number of missing
observations on our DV still remains manageable (about 300 out of 1275 observations).
Third, with respect to timing, note that t refers to the year in which a directive has
been officially drawn up by the EU Commission. This implies that all transposition noti-
fications referring to a particular directive are assigned to the year in which this directive
has been officially drawn up in Brussels. This kind of temporal matching seems adequate
for our theoretical set-up assuming that the government sets the agenda for the adequate
transposition instrument(s) immediately after it has received a directive from Brussels.
8We cannot account for cases in which the member state has actually transposed but “forgotten” to
notify transposition.
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Figure 2.2: Primary transposition ratios per member state, averaged across year and
policy areas
A given year t thus captures the governmental and economic constellations at that point
in time which we assume crucial for the government’s transposition decisions. Regarding
time, let us further emphasize that COLIij,t incorporates only, and only those reported
transposition measures which have been notified after the adoption date of a particular
directive. Practically, one finds notifications of transposition instruments dating back
until the early 20th century. Again, this time restriction for reported transposition mea-
sures suits our theoretical set-up, as we seek to explain the government’s transposition
reactions after it has received a directive from Brussels.
The figures below accordingly display our DV COLIij,t from three different per-
spectives: pooled mean primary transposition ratios per member state and per sector,
primary transposition records per member state or sector over time and primary trans-
position ratios by country, sector and year. All graphical illustrations immediately reveal
differences in primary transposition ratios along the three dimensions of our dataset, i.e.
across countries i, sectors j and time t respectively. Complementing the graphs below,
Tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 in the appendix demonstrate detailed summary statistics
for COLIij,t.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide an overall view on primary transposition ratios in the
EU. We see that mean primary transposition ratios are generally rather small and only
differ slightly across time when averaged across countries and sectors. However, once we
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Figure 2.3: Primary transposition ratios per policy area, averaged across years and
member states
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Figure 2.4: Primary transposition ratios per member state and year, averaged across
policy areas
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Figure 2.5: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year, averaged across mem-
ber states
compare primary transposition ratios across sectors and time averaged across member
states we get a different impression in figure 2.5: cross-sector differences become clear
both, in absolute values and over time. Apparently, primary transposition ratios are
highest for public/ social services and the energy/ environment sector. In addition to
the graphs below, summary statistics reveal overall means of .25 and .41 for primary
transposition ratios in the energy/environment sector and public/ social services.
Further, take a look at the third kind of figures grasping the full spectrum of varia-
tion in our DV from a dynamic cross-country cross-sector view. Regarding agriculture
and transport as frequently cited policy areas (see e.g. figures 2.10 and 2.8), primary
transposition ratios are strikingly high in Germany (D) (mean ratios of .22 and .25 re-
spectively) compared to the other member states. Except Austria (A) reveals an even
higher mean primary transposition ratio for agriculture (.27). With regard to transport,
four of the five Scandinavian countries show equally high or even higher primary trans-
position ratios over time resulting in a mean primary transposition ratio of e.g. 0.31
for Finland (FIN). This may hint at the proposed effect of national sector importance
on primary transposition ratios according to H 3. Both, Austria and the Scandinavian
countries, generally have a high stake in these two sectors of their national economies.
Value added shares (vash) for both of these sectors are among the highest across EU-15
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Figure 2.6: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Portugal (P), Spain
(SP) and Sweden (SW)
countries whereas for Germany’s economy these sectors seem to play a subordinate role
(see Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for details on vash).
As said before, for directives touching upon energy/ environment issues primary
transposition rates are generally high. Regarding primary transposition dynamics, Fig-
ures 2.8, 2.10 and 2.9 also show differences in timing for this policy area: whereas B and
D reveal peak primary transposition ratios for most years after 1995, F and particularly
DK reach peak values for the early 90s. Following H 4, different policy cycles in B, D, F
and DK as well as different government constellations may be accountable.
2.4.3 Independent variables
Sector characteristics
According to the literature on sector diversification (see e. g. Imbs (2003)), we straight-
forwardly take value added shares (vash) as indicator for sector size. Assuming that a
larger sector size indicates greater economic and thus political importance of a sector we
expect a positive effect on primary transposition according to H3. Looking at Tables
2.7 and 2.8 in the appendix, cross-country and cross-sector variations in sector sizes and
sector developments over time become apparent at first sight: Generally speaking, the
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Figure 2.7: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Italy (I), Luxem-
bourg (L) and The Netherlands (N)
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Figure 2.8: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for France (F), Ger-
many (D) and United Kingdom (UK)
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Figure 2.9: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Denmark (DK),
Finland (FIN) and Greece (GR)
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Figure 2.10: Primary transposition ratios per policy area and year for Belgium (B),
Ireland (IR) and Austria (A)
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group/ sector
characteristics
small group size large group size
high interest
specificity
agriculture, transport, en-
ergy/ environment
(finance) 12
low interest speci-
ficity
– public and social services,
industry
Table 2.1: Sector classification according to the group theory of Olson (1965)
three most important sectors of all economies are the aggregate financial and public and
social services as well as total manufacturing industries. Out of these, finance has taken
the lead in all member states except for public and social services in Denmark, Spain
and Sweden and total manufacturing industries in Finland and Ireland. Following these
are transport services (including storage) with relatively high shares in Sweden (5.7% in
1994), Denmark (5.6% in 2002) and Finland (7% in 2002). Although trends seem rather
similar for these aggregate sectors across EU members, levels differ markedly and confirm
the structural changes from industrial to service societies taking place in the member
states over the last two decades. According to Imbs (2003), employment shares (empsh)
are frequently applied as alternative measure for sector size. We will thus replace vash
by empsh in some of our model specifications. As for vash, data for empsh stems from
the OECD STAN indicators 2002.
In the lack of data on the number of lobby groups active in a particular sector per
country, we account for the potential national influence of lobby groups across sectors
of the national economies by adding a dummy variable lobby to our model specification.
In Table 2.1 we follow the group theory of Olson (1965) to distinguish sectors with
a generally higher potential for lobbying activities from sectors with a generally lower
potential for lobbying activities. According to Olson (1965), sectors with high interest
specificity and smaller group size have a generally higher potential to organize as sectors
in the other categories and are accordingly coded as 1. This is, of course, a very crude
measure of sector-specific lobby effects. Future research should clearly aim for a more
precise indicator in order to test H5.
Regarding H6, we create a dummy variable technic accounting for policy areas with
a potentially higher number of directives referring to technical obligations for implemen-
tation. Looking at the sectors in our sample, transport and energy and environment
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appear to be the rather technical ones and are accordingly coded with 1. As, by con-
struction, technic correlates highly with lobby we will only add one at a time to our basic
estimation model m1 in Table 2.3.
Political-institutional country-specific features
Testing H1, we include the variable vps of Tsebelis’s online dataset supposing that more
veto players may hinder the government to choose primary legislative transposition de-
vices. The number of veto player variable thereby entails the number of coalition parties,
but goes beyond it by adding systemic features hindering the legislative process.
According to H2a and H2b two types of measures assess the strengths of national
governments in our empirical analysis. The first class of indicators tries to capture the
position of a government within the respective executive-legislative relationship. Specif-
ically, govcontrol indicates a government’s agenda-control in parliamentary (legislative)
decision-making. Data stems from Do¨ring (1995b). Note for the interpretation of our
estimation results that higher scores on govcontrol refer to less control of the parlia-
mentary agenda by the government. Second, we turn to coalition governments in more
detail and take the fractionalisation index fraccab from the file collection of Cusack &
Engelhardt (2002) as indicator for the degree of fractionalisation within a government.
The more coalition parties, i.e. the more fractionalised and weaker a government, the
generally less legislative output according to Kreppel (1997)’s analysis and H2b. Due to
their contextual correlation we either add vps or fraccab to our model specification, but
not both at the same time.
Following Do¨ring (2004), H4 considers policy cycles to play a role for the government’s
transposition decision. In order to broadly test the effect of policy cycles we include a
dummy variable election for years in which a parliamentary election takes place in a
specific country. Data stems from the variable wahldatu in the file collection of Cusack
& Engelhardt (2002).
EU membership benefits
Assessing the economic benefits stemming from EU membership in proposition H7, we
add a variable neteureceipts. It measures the yearly amount of fiscal transfers a country
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is receiving from Brussels minus its budgetary contributions to the EU. Thus, in line
with Perkins & Neumayer (2007) we opt for net EU transfers rather than for the sum
of mere EU transfers, supposing that it is the fact of being a ‘net EU recipient’ or a
‘net EU payer’ that makes a difference for a country’s transposition rationale. Data was
collected from the respective German statistical yearbooks published by DeStatis.
Control variables
Besides our main explanatory variables testing H1-H7, we include control variables to
our basic model specification accounting for additional systemic, macroeconomic and
EU-level influences.
On top of the veto player variable, we insert personal to our model in order to
control for system inherent features fostering the level of parliamentary fragmentation.
More precisely personal, indicates the influence of the personal vote in a voting system
according to Hallerberg (2004). It is an index ranging from 0.2 for the Netherlands to 7.6
for Finland. Hallerberg (2004) argues that the more personalized a voting system is, the
greater its parliamentary fragmentation. We thus expect a positive relationship between
voting systems with a high influence of the personal vote and primary transposition
ratios as in more fragmented parliaments effective opposition in plenary would probably
become more difficult.
We additionally include logged gdppcr ln in real terms in order to account for the
relative wealth of a country. gdppcr ln controls for the alternative hypothesis that ad-
ministrations of wealthier countries are more developed and more effective and thus able
to generally transpose more.
Finally, as a complement to our two measures of sector size vash and empsh, we
add labour compensation per employee, labemp, to assess a sector’s national economic
importance. Data stems from the OECD STAN Indicators 2002.
2.4.4 Estimation model and method
Linking theory to practice, we opt for a generalized linear regression model (GLM) and
the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) suggested by Papke & Wooldridge
(1996). We find this particular model specification and estimation method adequate for
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our data structure, especially for dealing with our bounded fractional dependent variable
COLI. The standard way of handling this kind of dependent variable would be a log-
odds transformation of the dependent variable: log(y/(1 − y)). However, clearly, this
approach does not allow for the dependent variable to be equal to zero or one without
further data adjustments. Since our dataset contains many observations on the extremes
and especially on zero, Papke and Wooldridge’s GLM and QML estimation method seems
to be preferable (see Papke & Wooldridge (1996)).
Additional properties of our sample such as its unbalancedness including a large num-
ber of missing values of our dependent variable as well as its time-series structure turned
out to be less problematic when taking a closer look at the data. In particular, selection
bias does not seem to be a real problem as only 22 of the 157 missing observations of our
dependent variable are due to non-notification of transposition instruments9. All other
missing observations indicate that there have been no directives adopted in Brussels
needing to be transposed by a member state in a particular sector. As mentioned above,
this is the case for Austria, Finland and Sweden before 1995, i.e. their official admission
date. The 22 non-notifications further seem to be distributed randomly among member
states and sectors as descriptive statistics have shown. Thus, in the case of random
selection we do not need to fear selection bias.
Regarding the time-series structure of our data, we have further tested for a dynamic
model specification and estimated standard Arellano & Bond (1991) dynamic panel re-
gressions. These have revealed that the dynamic effects in our data are not pronounced
as the lagged dependent variable turned out insignificant in all model specifications for
the one-step Arellano & Bond (1991) estimations. This confirms our model choice, viz.
the aforementioned three-dimensional generalized linear model (GLM) which Papke &
Wooldridge (1996) formulate as the regression:
E(yijt|xijt, zjt) = G(xijtβ, zjtγ) (2.1)
where j = 1, . . . , 15 is the index denoting the member states, i = 1, . . . , 5 that for
economic sectors and t = 1, . . . , 16, indicates years, as described above in detail. xijt is
the vector of our set of independent sector specific variables10 varying across countries
9In our dataset non-notification of transposition instruments is indicated by anzcoyr2 == 0.
10Respectively: {vash, empsh, labemp, technic, lobby} .
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and sectors as well as time in the case of vash, empsh and labemp. zjt stands for our set
of politico-institutional and macroeconomic independent variables11 differing only across
countries and time except for the time-invariant dummy variables, i.e. election. β and
γ indicate the two corresponding sets of parameters to be estimated. Following Papke
& Wooldridge (1996), G(·) is a known function satisfying 0 < G(δ) < 1 for all δ ∈ <
ensuring that the predicted values of yijt lies within [0, 1] . Importantly, equation (1) is
well defined even if yijt takes on 0 or 1 with positive probability. Usually, G(·) is decided
to be a cumulative distribution function (cdf), which most frequently is either the logistic
function or the standard normal cdf. In our case we opt for the probit function as the
logistic one led to numerical convergence problems for some of our model specifications.
The error term entailed by (1) is defined implicitly by E(εijt|xijt, zit) = 0 . Further,
we add a constant β0 into our regression as well a linear time trend to control for the
non-stationarity of our macroeconomic independent variables.
The coefficients β and γ in (1) can consistently be estimated via non-linear least
squares (NLS). However, according to Papke & Wooldridge (1996), heteroscedasticity is
likely to be present since V ar(yijt|xijt, zjt) is unlikely to be constant when yijt ∈ [0, 1] and
thus NLS is not efficient. Papke & Wooldridge (1996) therefore suggest quasi-maximum
likelihood estimation by maximizing the Bernoulli log-likelihood function, given by
lijt(β, γ) ≡ yijt log[G(xijtβ, zjtγ)] + (1− yijt) log[1−G(xijtβ, zjtγ)]. (2.2)
The resulting Bernoulli-QMLEs βˆ and γˆ are accordingly given by
max
β,γ
15∑
j=1
5∑
i=1
16∑
t=1
lijt(β, γ) (2.3)
This estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the distribution of
yijt conditional on xijt, zit . Further, it is efficient, see Papke & Wooldridge (1996).
In order to additionally account for heteroscedasticity of unknown form, we use robust
standard errors in all model specifications presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
All our estimations were carried out in STATA 8.2 applying the xtgee-command for
generalized linear panel estimation. We specify a binomial distribution for our dependent
variable, a probit link function and an independent within-group correlation structure.
11Respectively: {fraccab, govcontrol, election, vps, personal, gdppcr ln, neteureceipts} .
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2.5 Empirical results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below display the estimated effects of our various political-economic
variables on primary to total transposition ratios across countries and sectors. Tables
2.6, 2.11 and 2.12 in the appendix give an overview on variable definitions, data sources
and summary statistics which might be useful for following our interpretations.
Table 2.2 includes netEUreceipts to the model specifications displayed in 2.3. We
chose to display two separate tables as the number of observations changes remarkably
in models m1n to m6n, i.e. when netEUreceipts is added to models m1 to m6. Mod-
els m1 and m1n are the respective basic models. Due to their strong correlation, we
subsequently add the sector characteristics vash, empsh, lobby and technic. In addition
to the models presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, we provide further estimation results in
our STATA do-files which are available from the author upon request. These contain
specifications including the number of veto players vps, a dummy for bicameral systems
as well as legal system dummies. As these variables have turned out insignificant (except
for the German and Common law dummy which is not surprising according to the earlier
provided descriptive statistics for the UK, Ireland, Austria and Germany), we leave them
aside in our final model specifications presented in 2.2 and 2.3.
Looking at the estimated coefficients of models m1n-m6n and m1-m6 we find the
estimated coefficient signs and sizes to be quite robust across specifications. Only the es-
timated coefficients of value added and employment shares (vash and empsh) remarkably
change their signs and significance levels across specifications. Apparently, controlling
for certain sector specific effects, such as group size and interest specificity in the case
of lobby or technicality of a sector in the case of technic affects the estimated coefficient
sizes and signs of our sector size measures. Further, some of our political-institutional
variables, i.e. fraccab and personal as well as election become statistically insignificant
when adding neteureceipts. This may be due to a non-random reduction of our sample
size. Overall, however, the model fit seems reasonably high looking at the sizes of the
chi2 -tests against the null hypothesis of all coefficients being zero.
Feeling reasonably satisfied with the validity of our statistical analysis, we proceed to
interpreting the estimated coefficient signs and significance levels corresponding to our
theoretical propositions H1-H7. First, regarding political-institutional effects on trans-
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coli m1n m2n m3n m4n m5n m6n
fraccab 0.396 0.403 0.379 0.389 0.444 * 0.462 **
(0.247) (0.246) (0.252) (0.251) (0.247) (0.236)
govcontrol 0.094 ** 0.092 ** 0.100 ** 0.100 ** 0.096 ** 0.100 ***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.037)
election -0.103 * -0.104 * -0.097 -0.098 -0.094 -0.098
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
neteureceipts -2.55e-05 * -2.55e-05 * -2.70e-05 ** -2.72e-05 ** -2.77e-05 *** -2.68e-05 ***
(1.53e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.31e-05) (9.82e-06) (9.50e-06)
empsh 0.008 * -0.003 -0.042 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
labemp 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
personal -0.032 -0.032 -0.035 -0.035 -0.042 -0.043
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
gdppcrln 0.746 *** 0.740 *** 0.813 *** 0.813 *** 0.659 *** 0.622 ***
(0.255) (0.256) (0.257) (0.255) (0.238) (0.235)
year 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
vash 0.006 -0.008 -0.048 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
technic -0.567 ** -0.694 ***
(0.254) (0.249)
lobby -1.587 *** -1.508 ***
(0.354) (0.333)
cons -28.475 -27.982 -26.281 -25.448 -28.961 -29.090
(28.567) (28.853) (27.908) (27.864) (23.959) (23.368)
N of obs 665 666 665 666 665 666
N of groups (country * sector) 71 72 71 71 71 72
Obs per group (avg) 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3
WALD chi2 80.573 77.464 78.516 80.401 117.100 125.283
Table 2.2: Generalized estimation equation results: including net EU receipts; Notes:
We use robust standard errors and include a linear time trend throughout.
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coli m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
fraccab 0.465 * 0.483 * 0.436 * 0.454 * 0.504 ** 0.545 **
(0.260) (0.262) (0.259) (0.258) (0.253) (0.232)
govcontrol 0.089 ** 0.085 ** 0.095 ** 0.095 ** 0.091 ** 0.095 ***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.034)
election -0.111 ** -0.111 ** -0.108 ** -0.108 ** -0.107 * -0.108 *
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
empsh 0.008 * -0.002 -0.043 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
labemp 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
personal -0.056 * -0.056 * -0.059 * -0.059 * -0.068 ** -0.069 **
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
gdppcrln 0.898 *** 0.880 *** 0.975 *** 0.969 *** 0.827 *** 0.773 ***
(0.244) (0.246) (0.249) (0.245) (0.223) (0.214)
year 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)
vash 0.005 -0.009 -0.053 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
technic -0.570 ** -0.724 ***
(0.270) (0.259)
lobby -1.610 *** -1.617 ***
(0.395) (0.329)
cons -26.100 -25.690 -23.263 -22.182 -26.567 -26.680
(28.919) (29.170) (27.997) (27.763) (24.012) (23.098)
N of obs 740 742 740 742 740 742
N of groups (country * sector) 72 72 72 72 72 72
Obs per group (avg) 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
WALD chi2 76.230 74.492 81.120 87.030 96.478 108.475
Table 2.3: Generalized estimation equation results: excluding net EU receipts
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position mode, we find parliamentary agenda-control by the government, govcontrol, to
insert the contra-intuitive negative significant effect proposed by Do¨ring (1995a) and
Henning (1995) and formulated in H2a (remember that higher scores on govcontrol in-
dicate less governmental control of the parliamentary agenda). In countries where G
withholds a strong position in the national executive-legislative relationship transposi-
tion via parliament seems to be less frequent. Further, against our proposition H2b,
the effect of cabinet fractionalisation fraccab on primary transposition ratio turned out
positive and significant (except for the models in Table 2.2). This is, however, well in
line with our result on H2a and further strengthens the argument of Do¨ring (1995a) and
Henning (1995). Further surprising on first sight, but in line with these results is a neg-
ative effect of a high score on the personal voting index personal. Apparently, the more
fragmented the national parliament the less primary legislation is used for transposition.
Above this, policy cycles seem to play a statistically significant role in most specifica-
tions. Corresponding to H4, we find a negative effect of election on primary transposition
ratios. In years in which a parliamentary election takes place, member states apparently
transpose less via primary legislation.
It remains to mention with respect to the anticipated political-institutional effects
that H1 cannot be approved by our empirical investigation. The estimated coefficient
of the number of veto-players vps turned out with the anticipated negative sign but
insignificant and therefore has been left aside in the final model specifications displayed
in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. STATA-do-files containing these results are, however, available
from the author upon request.
With respect to economic sector characteristics, we find value added shares vash and
employment shares empsh to assert the anticipated positive and, in the case of empsh,
significant effect on primary transposition ratios according to H3. However, when con-
trolling for technical sectors, i.e. energy/ environment and transport, or sectors with a
high potential for lobbying activities, i.e. agriculture, energy/ environment and trans-
port, both of the estimated coefficients change their signs and become highly significant
(see models 2 and 3). The estimated negative and significant coefficients of technic and
lobby further support hypotheses H5 and H6. However, our measures for testing H5 and
H6 are quite crude making these variables and their interaction with vash and empsh
75
difficult to interpret. Data quality thus needs to be improved before finally judging hy-
potheses H3, H5 and H6. Interesting to note is a positive and strongly significant effect of
our alternative measure of sector importance, i.e. sectoral labour compensation labemp.
Regarding EU-membership benefits, we notice primary transposition ratios to de-
crease the more net transfers a member state receives from the EU. Apparently, net EU
recipients transpose more via secondary legislative devices and seem less prone against
transposition delays (see Ko¨nig et al. (2005)) and infringement procedures (see Perkins
& Neumayer (2007)).
Finally, a country’s general wealth approxied by gdppcr ln seems to positively affect
the ratio of primary to total transpositions.
2.6 Conclusions
Our study on the national legal transposition modes reveals that all three hypothesized
factors matter for EU directives: politico-institutional constellations, economic sector
characteristics as well as EU membership benefits. Specifically, we find that primary to
total transposition ratios decrease with the strength of a government, both relative to
opposition in parliament and within the government coalition. Primary transposition
devices are employed less towards the end of an election period and if a MS is a ‘net-
recipient’ of EU transfers. Wealthier countries, however, generally transpose more via
parliament. Regarding policy areas, we find that secondary transposition devices are
preferably used for directives touching upon technical sectors or sectors with a high
lobbying potential. For directives touching upon sectors with high labour compensations
per employee governments, however, seem to prefer primary transposition devices. Our
main sector characteristic, i.e. sector importance, came out playing a significant role
for primary transposition ratios in most model specifications though the direction of the
effect still needs to be further specified.
These results are innovative since, so far, the transposition and implementation lit-
erature lacks a cross-sector view on national transposition performances – though cross-
sector analyses on the issue of EU law implementation are common in practitioners’
publications as the EU Commission’s Internal Market Scoreboard. Looking at the results
of our first attempt of a cross-sector panel investigation on the legal transposition instru-
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ment(s) used by member states, strongly suggests paying more attention to sector-specific
effects in this research area.
With respect to theory, constructing a full theoretical model explaining first a govern-
ment’s general willingness to transpose EU directives and second the nationally preferred
modes of transposition instruments remains an exercise left to future research. Although
desirable, this was beyond the scope of our empirically focused study. However, our em-
pirical results may serve to motivate efforts in enhancing theory on these issues. Hope-
fully, we assist this endeavor by providing a framework structuring the government’s
decision path and sketching its utility function when it comes to implementing a direc-
tive received from Brussels. In this regard, it might further be worthwhile thinking of
possible interaction effects between political-institutional, economic sector characteristics
and national legal procedures.
Concluding, we would like to remark on possible improvements of our data quality and
applied econometrics. Besides our effort in presenting a sound projection of the trans-
position reality, our empirical analysis is limited by the need to collect the data within
a reasonable time frame. Future studies should clearly aim at constructing a compre-
hensive index for ‘government strength’ according to an elaborated, clear-cut theoretical
argument, improving measures on sector-specific lobbying potential and adding EU-level
characteristics of directives such as word count, initiating institution and decision-time
taken. The categorization of our dependent variable should be worked on and the ‘grey-
zone’ between primary and secondary transposition instruments further analysed and
specified. With respect to our estimations, future analysis could specify the error vari-
ance structure directly as an alternative to our use of robust standard errors. This would
be a means for modeling theoretically plausible group effects inherent to our data struc-
ture. Nevertheless, we find our results useful in that they may open the door to a new
political-economic, cross-sector dimension in studies on EU law transposition and imple-
mentation by the member states, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
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Table 2.4: Classification of policy areas
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Variable name Definition
Directive-based data coded by country,
sector and year:
xr,ijt(anzprimr,ijt) the number of primary transposition instruments that member state i declared
in sector j for directive r at any time after the adoption date t16 of the directive
r (= quasi-continuous number).
yr,ijt(anzcoyrr,ijt) the total number of (i.e. primary as well as secondary) transposition instruments
that member state i declared in sector j for directive r at any time after the
adoption date t of the directive r (= quasi-continuous number).
COLIr,ijt (xr,ijt/yr,ijt) ratio of primary to total transposition instruments that member
state i declared in sector j for each directive r at any time after the adoption
date t of a directive r (= percentage ratio bounded between 0 and 1).
COLI dr,ijt COLIr,ijt coded as dummy variable: COLI dr,ijt =
 1 if COLIr,ijt > 00 otherwise.
Sector-based data coded by country and
year:
COLIijt
1
R
∑R
r=1COLI dr,ijt for the number of directives r = {1, . . . , R} in a given sector
j, member state i and year t (= percentage ratio bounded between 0 and 1).
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independent
variable
hypothesis expected
effects
definition data source
political-institutional variables
vps H1 - Number of veto players Tsebelis, G. online dataset: http://www.
polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/
govcontrol H2a - Government control of plenary agenda index ranging
from 1 “The government alone determines the ple-
nary agenda” to 7 “The Chamber itself determines
the agenda”
Do¨ring (1995a, Table 7.1)
fraccabv H2b - Index of fractionalisation of cabinet, ranging from 0
to 0.78.
Cusack & Engelhardt (2002)
election H4 - Dummy variable where 1 indicates a parliamentary
election in this year for a specific member state; data
on election dates stems from the variable wahldatu
Cusack & Engelhardt (2002)
economic sector characteristics
vash H3 + Value added shares relative to the total economy;
each industry’s value added as a percentage of value
added for the total economy
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
empsh H3 + Employment shares in the total economy; shows each
industry’s employment as a percentage of employ-
ment for the total economy.
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
technic H5 - Dummy for technical sectors where 1 indicates a tech-
nical sector, i.e. transport and energy/ environment
Own data
lobby H6 - Dummy for sectors with high potential for lobbying
activities according to Olson’s group theory, i.e. agri-
culture, energy/ environment and transport.
Own data
EU-membership benefits
neteureceipts H7 + Netrec-Netpay: Net EU Revenues - Net EU Pay-
ments; total billions German Mark (DM)
DeStatis: Statistisches Jahrbuch 2002
control variables
personal + Personal vote index indicating the relative incentives
of a given system for the personal vote ranging from
0.2 to 7.6 for 18 European states.
Do¨ring & Hallerberg (2004, Table 1.2)
labemp + Labour compensation per employee for the total
economy; ratio of labour compensation for a partic-
ular industry to the number engaged divided by the
ratio of labour compensation for the total economy to
the number of persons engaged for the total economy
OECD STAN Indicators 2004
bicam + Dummy variable for bicameral vs. unicameral legis-
latures
CIA (2005)
gdppcr ln + GDP per capita in real terms Eurostat
Table 2.6: Operationalisation and data sources for independent variables
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3 most important sectors vash per year in % % change additional sectors vash per year in % % change
1986 1994 2000 1986 1994 2000
Italy Italy
Finance 19.5 22.7 26.0 6.5 Agriculture 4.4 3.2 2.6 −1.8
Industry 42.3 38.8 37.0 −5.3 Transport 5.6 5.7 5.1 −0.6
Public and social services 17.1 18.7 18.5 1.4 Enerty/ Enviroment 1.8 2.3 2.2 0.3
Luxembourg Luxembourg
Finance 32.2 38.9 44.4 12.2 Agriculture 1.9 1.0 0.7 −1.2
Public and social services 15.7 16.3 14.7 −1.1 Transport .. .. .. ..
Industry 36.5 27.0 23.0 −13.5 Energy/ Environment 3.2 2.7 2.1 −1.1
The Netherlands The Netherlands
Finance 18.3 22.5 26.4 8.1 Agriculture 4.4 3.6 2.8 −1.6
Public and social services 24.3 23.4 22.0 −2.2 Transport 4.8 5.0 4.8 −0.1
Industry 33.4 32.9 31.2 −2.1 Energy/ Environment 2.2 1.9 1.5 −0.8
Portugal Portugal
Public and social services 17.4 23.4 .. 6 Agriculture 9.4 5.2 .. −4.2
Industry 43.2 37.8 .. −5.4 Transport 5.6 3.7 .. −1.9
Finance 13.5 17.8 .. 4.3 Energy/ Environment 2.9 3.3 .. 0.4
Sweden Sweden
Public and social services .. 24.5 24.3 −0.1 Transport 5.8 5.7 5.7 −0.1
Finance 19.2 23.7 24.6 5.4 Agriculture 4.0 2.7 1.9 −2.1
Industry 35.4 32.8 34.2 −1.2 Energy/ Environment 3.2 3.3 2.4 −0.8
UK UK
Finance 20.1 24.2 27.2 7.1 Agriculture 2.1 1.7 1.0 −1.1
Public and social services 15.2 21.7 21.6 6.3 Energy/ Environment 2.9 7.3 6.3 3.4
Industry 36.7 34.7 32.3 −4.4 Transport 5.2 5.0 4.9 −0.3
Austria Austria
Finance 16.6 20 23.6 7 Agriculture 3.8 2.7 2.3 −1.5
Industry 22.7 19.4 20.5 −2.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 21.0 22.0 19.8 −1.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Belgium Belgium
Finance 21.4 25.5 27.9 6.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 24.1 24.0 24.6 0.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 22.5 19.6 1.7 −3.8 .. .. .. .. ..
Table 2.7: Value added shares of six selected industries in Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, Austria, Belgium; 1986-2002, Source: OECD STAN
Indicators 2002
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3 most important sectors vash per year in % % change additional sectors vash per year in % % change
1986 1994 2000 1986 1994 2000
Germany Germany
Finance 22.0 26.9 .. 4.9 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 30.6 23.1 .. −7.5 .. .. .. .. ..
Public and social services 19.8 21.4 .. 1.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Denmark Denmark
Public and social services 24.5 26.7 26.6 2.1 Transport 4.9 5.4 5.6 0.7
Finance 20.7 23.4 24.3 3.6 Agriculture 5.0 3.3 2.3 −2.7
Industry 18.5 16.8 15.6 −2.9 .. .. .. .. ..
Spain Spain
Public and social services 17.8 20.6 20.4 2.6 Agriculture 5.8 4.7 3.2 −2.6
Finance 17.6 18.5 20.0 2.4 Transport and storage 5.7 5.5 .. −0.2
Industry 23.8 18.3 16.8 −7 .. .. .. .. ..
Finland Finland
Industry 24.1 23.6 23.5 −0.6 Transport and storage 6.7 7.5 7.0 0.3
Public and social services 21.1 23.3 21.6 0.5 Agriculture 6.7 5.2 3.5 −3.2
Finance 15.7 19.1 21.4 5.7 .. .. .. .. ..
France France
Finance 24.6 28.2 30.5 5.9 Health and social work 5.6 6.5 6.8 1.2
Public and social services 21.4 23.0 23.7 2.3 Construction 5.7 5.5 4.9 −0.8
Industry 32.1 18.3 17.5 −14.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Greece Greece
Finance 15.2 20.6 21.2 6.0 .. 11.5 10.4 7.0 −4.5
Public and social services 16.9 19.5 21.1 4.2 .. .. .. .. ..
Industry 17.8 14.0 11.8 −6.0 .. .. .. .. ..
Ireland Ireland
Industry 26.1 27.1 32.9 6.8 Agriculture 10.0 8.5 3.5 −6.5
Finance 16.8 16.4 20.2 3.4 .. .. .. .. ..
Community 19.2 21.2 16.2 −3.0 .. .. .. .. ..
Table 2.8: Value added shares of six selected industries in Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece and Ireland; 1986-2002, Source: OECD STAN Indicators 2002
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country variable obs mean std. dev. min max
B coli 83 0.17 0.21 0 0.80
F coli 84 0.20 0.22 0 0.80
D coli 84 0.35 0.30 0 1.00
IR coli 82 0.07 0.16 0 0.80
UK coli 84 0.01 0.05 0 0.38
A coli 39 0.45 0.32 0 1.00
DK coli 83 0.24 0.25 0 0.83
FIN coli 39 0.33 0.26 0 1.00
GR coli 84 0.05 0.12 0 0.50
I coli 83 0.10 0.18 0 1.00
L coli 83 0.17 0.22 0 0.83
N coli 83 0.24 0.25 0 1.00
P coli 85 0.05 0.13 0 1.00
SP coli 84 0.17 0.21 0 0.67
SW coli 38 0.20 0.26 0 1.00
Table 2.9: Summary statistics for DV per country
sector variable obs mean std. dev. min max
agriculture coli 228 0.05 0.10 0 0.44
energy/ environment coli 226 0.23 0.26 0 1.00
industry coli 228 0.09 0.09 0 0.45
transport coli 211 0.10 0.20 0 1.00
pub./ soc. services coli 225 0.37 0.29 0 1.00
Table 2.10: Summary statistics for DV per sector
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country sector variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Belgium (B) agriculture coli 17 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.13
energy/ environment coli 17 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.67
industry coli 17 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.21
transport coli 15 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.33
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.38 0.21 0.00 0.80
France (F) agriculture coli 17 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.30
energy/ environment coli 17 0.26 0.27 0.00 0.80
industry coli 17 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.29
transport coli 16 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.33
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.46 0.21 0.00 0.75
Germany (D) agriculture coli 17 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.38
energy/ environment coli 17 0.40 0.31 0.00 0.80
industry coli 17 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.45
transport coli 16 0.25 0.33 0.00 1.00
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.68 0.21 0.33 1.00
Ireland (IR) agriculture coli 17 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.10
energy/ environment coli 17 0.11 0.22 0.00 0.80
industry coli 17 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08
transport coli 15 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.13
pub./ soc. services coli 16 0.19 0.23 0.00 0.75
United Kingdom (UK) agriculture coli 17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
energy/ environment coli 17 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.38
industry coli 17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
transport coli 16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria (A) agriculture coli 8 0.27 0.09 0.13 0.41
energy/ environment coli 8 0.53 0.34 0.00 0.86
industry coli 8 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.32
transport coli 7 0.40 0.27 0.00 0.86
pub./ soc. services coli 8 0.89 0.14 0.67 1.00
Denmark (DK) agriculture coli 17 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.14
energy/ environment coli 16 0.37 0.27 0.00 0.75
industry coli 17 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.38
transport coli 16 0.17 0.24 0.00 0.75
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.48 0.23 0.00 0.83
Finland (FIN) agriculture coli 8 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.44
energy/ environment coli 8 0.41 0.30 0.00 0.86
industry coli 8 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.31
transport coli 8 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.67
pub./ soc. services coli 7 0.64 0.21 0.43 1.00
Table 2.11: Summary statistics for DV per sector in Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
the UK, Austria, Denmark and Finland
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country sector variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Greece (GR) agriculture coli 17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
energy/ environment coli 17 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.50
industry coli 17 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.13
transport coli 16 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.33
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.50
Italy (I) agriculture coli 17 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.29
energy/ environment coli 17 0.22 0.31 0.00 1.00
industry coli 17 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.14
transport coli 15 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.33
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.43
Luxembourg (L) agriculture coli 17 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06
energy/ environment coli 17 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.71
industry coli 17 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.21
transport coli 15 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.40
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.45 0.20 0.00 0.83
The Netherlands (N) agriculture coli 17 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.33
energy/ environment coli 17 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.75
industry coli 17 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.32
transport coli 15 0.25 0.28 0.00 1.00
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.50 0.25 0.00 1.00
Portugal (P) agriculture coli 17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
energy/ environment coli 17 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.17
industry coli 17 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.18
transport coli 17 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
pub./soc. services coli 17 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.44
Spain (SP) agriculture coli 17 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06
energy/ environment coli 17 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.57
industry coli 17 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.23
transport coli 16 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.25
pub./ soc. services coli 17 0.46 0.15 0.2 0.67
Sweden (SW) agriculture coli 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
energy/ environment coli 7 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.50
industry coli 8 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.43
transport coli 8 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.33
pub./ soc. services coli 7 0.58 0.27 0.2 1.00
Table 2.12: Summary statistics for DV per sector in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden
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Chapter 3
Centralization without
implementation? Lessons to learn
from fiscal federalist theory for the
study of Europeanization1
3.1 Introduction
The EU today covers more areas, than classical fiscal federalist theory (CFF) according
to Oates (1972) would suggest. Common explanations for the EU’s incentive to widen
its legislative competencies in the political science literature are:
• the self-interest of the EU Commission following supranationalist theory according
to e.g. Sandholtz & Stone Sweet (1997),
• the cumulative logic of EU integration following a neo-functionalist or historical
institutionalist approach (see e.g. Haas (1958), Haas (1961) and Pierson (1996))
or
1This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen von Hagen, University of Bonn. Earlier versions
have been presented at the BGSE Macro/Finance/Public Finance Seminar of the University of Bonn,
and the 2nd conference of the DFG priority programme 1124 on ‘Federalism: Theory and Empirical
Evidence’ in Berlin.
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• the bargaining structure of EU Treaty decisions according to intergovernmentalist
and liberal-intergovernmentalist theory (see e.g. Moravcsik (1991) and Moravcsik
(1993)).
An interesting question is to ask whether these processes have lead to an economically
efficient de facto allocation of policy prerogatives in the EU. This has been the subject
of recent empirical studies. CFF has in that context proved to be a fruitful theoretical
approach for judging the efficiency of the actual prerogative allocation across policy
areas. So far, Alesina et al. (2005) and Pollack (2000) both have empirically investigated
the development of EU legislation across policy areas. However, whereas Pollack (2000)
focuses on the centralization process in the post-Maastricht era, Alesina et al. (2005)
evaluate the efficiency of the resulting allocation of decision-making power between the
EU and the member states from a normative fiscal federalist perspective. From a similar
perspective, but non-statistically, Tabellini (2003) analyses how tasks should be divided
between member states and the EU.
Turning to the other side of the coin, namely to the transposition and implementation
of EU decisions in the member states, we expect CFF to have substantial explanatory
power not only for judging the efficiency of the EU’s allocation of policy preferences but
also for analysing cross-sector implementation performances in the case of EU directives.
Based on the assumption that member states have a higher incentive to transpose if a
directive is economically advantageous for the union, we argue that CFF-efficient policy
areas should reveal higher transposition ratios. Our empirical results strongly support
this hypothesis.
3.2 Relevant literature
Pollack (2000)’s and Alesina et al. (2005)’s results on EU policy-making provide em-
pirical evidence against the hypothesis that the Maastricht Treaty should have led to a
reduction in EU policy-making activities. Pollack (2000) finds a clear centralizing trend
strengthening the EU’s policy-making role between 1950 and 1992. Alesina et al. (2005)
confirm this general trend of increasing legislative activities by the EU over the last 30
years. Regarding individual policy areas, they conclude that the EU’s policy-making
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action has expanded most visibly in areas that are rather remote from the EU’s original
mission of establishing a free market with a common external trade policy, e.g. inter-
national trade, sectoral business (including transport, agriculture and industry), citizen
and social protection. Taking word counts in EU Treaties as measures of policy inten-
sity, citizens and social protection, sectoral business relations and common market as
well as money and finance have received the greatest attention. According to Alesina
et al. (2005), these findings speak for a certain substitutability between Treaties and
secondary legislation as vehicles for adopting policy by the EU. Especially the Common
Market and monetary/financial matters are extensively represented in the Treaties, but
occur less prominently in secondary EU legislation, i.e. EU directives or regulations. For
international trade and non-sectoral business it is the other way around.
Besides investigating the extent of EU legislative activities across policy domains,
Alesina et al. (2005) quantify whether the normative claims of fiscal federalist theory
on prerogative allocation are satisfied by the actual division of policy authority between
the EU and the member states. Tabellini (2003) follows a similar, but non-empirical,
approach, investigating the division of responsibilities between the EU and its members.
Building on fiscal federalist theory, both argue that for a more efficient prerogative
allocation the policy-making authority for public goods revealing high externalities and
evoking relatively low preference asymmetries such as defense, foreign policy and law
enforcement should lie with the EU. Whereas for public goods with smaller economies of
scale and greater heterogeneity of preferences, such as education, decentralization seems
the better alternative. Alesina et al. (2005)’s empirical investigation reveals, however,
that not all sectors are allocated to the normatively anticipated level of government.
Examples include environment policy, agriculture, international relations and citizen
and social protection. Tabellini (2003) advocates a more effective enforcement of the
Single Market by further centralizing authority for this policy area at the EU level.
According to him, legislation by the EU concerning redistributive policies, as involved
in agricultural policy, structural funds and the social charter, should be scaled back.
Accompanying these empirical approaches, Alesina & Wacziarg (1999) and Alesina,
Angeloni & Etro (2001) provide formal models for the optimal allocation of policy pre-
rogatives in federal systems and international unions. The equilibrium solution arises
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from a trade-off between the voters’, or union members’, preferences for keeping the
policy “at home”and the need to correct for externalities which may spill over beyond
the boundaries of a given administrative unit. In other words, if interests diverge trans-
ferring authority to a higher level of government may result in costly policies as they
may be less preferred by the locals. On the other hand, not doing so might lead to the
under-provision of certain government services, if the said services entail externalities
which extend beyond the local polity.
However, what matters for the practical functioning of a union is not only an opti-
mal distribution of policy prerogatives but whether its centralized decisions are actually
implemented by lower level entities in a correct, timely and complete fashion. In the
case of EU directives, national implementation first requires transposition into national
legislation. This is what studies of Europeanization and compliance have investigated
over the last decade. According to He´ritier, Kerwer, Knill, Lehmkuhl, Teutsch & Douil-
let (2001) Europeanization is defined as “the process of influence deriving from European
decisions and impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative struc-
tures”. Closely related to the issue of Europeanization are studies of compliance, i.e. the
fulfillment of EU legislation in the member states.
To our knowledge, comparative policy-oriented investigations in both of these research
strands are still rare. Recently, however, Bo¨rzel et al. (2005) (BHP) have introduced
policy area dummies in their analysis of national infringement cases in order to account
for possible policy-specific effects. Although they are so far unable to identify exactly
which policy-related aspects are at work they find strong empirical evidence for policy-
specific differences in national expositions to infringement cases. Bo¨rzel & Panke (2005)
(BP) further elaborate on the idea of policy-specific factors influencing a member state’s
proneness to EU infringement cases. BP do, however, not yet provide empirical evidence
for their argumentative perceptions. Using the newly developed dataset on EU member
states’ transposition records by Ko¨nig et al. (2005) (KLM), Treutlein (2007) tries to
further track sector-specific influences by including sector-level OECD STAN Indicators
such as value added shares, employment shares, labour compensation per employee etc.
in her statistical analysis. Both, KLM and Treutlein, find significant evidence for sector-
specific effects regarding the timeliness of transposition and the type of legal transposition
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instruments used by a member state government. However, so far, no comparative policy-
investigation exists explaining cross-sector differences in transposition ratios (or, v.v.,
transposition deficits). This is what this study aimed at.
Following CFF, Alesina & Wacziarg (1999)’s and Alesina et al. (2001)’s models of
optimal prerogative devolution in federal systems we ask whether underlying sector char-
acteristics, namely the heterogeneity of policy preferences and the level of externalities,
may also affect the transposition performances of member states, i.e. a government’s
willingness to transpose. In other words, we ask whether an CFF-efficient allocation of
policy prerogatives fosters the transposition of EU directives in the member states. This
would imply transposition to be less complete in policy areas which are far from EU
issues.
An empirical approach to these research questions seems relevant to us for the fol-
lowing reasons:
First, we address the political effects of an optimal policy allocation within federal
systems or international unions. Second, we hope to stimulate theoretical work regarding
the implementation of EU law by providing new empirical insights and by linking two
strands of the literature that have so far evolved independently of each other. Third, we
employ econometric tools that account for the multilevel structure of our dataset.
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps: in the next section we sketch the the-
oretical argument and derive testable theoretical propositions. We then describe our
dataset in section 4. Section 5 discusses the econometric model, estimation method and
estimation results. Finally, we summarize our main conclusions in section 6.
3.3 Linking CFF to Europeanization
3.3.1 The implementation puzzle of EU directives
We consider the EU as a multi-level quasi-federal governmental system in which a group
of countries is organized in a union. The decision-making authority for some policy ar-
eas is allocated at the upper governance level, i.e. the union level. The implementation
of policies is left to the lower level of governance, i.e. the member states respectively.
Member states are legally obliged to implement EU decisions (see Art. 249,3 and Art.
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10,1 of the EC Treaty (ECT)). In the case of failure, the EU may initiate a so-called in-
fringement procedure against the corresponding member state government (see Art. 211,
226 and 228 ECT). There are many decision-makers on the union level and they do not
necessarily coincide with the national implementation authorities, i.e. the member state
governments and administrations. This may actually be one reason why implementation
deficits have been frequently observed in empirical studies (see e.g. the Commission’s
Internal Market Scoreboards). Although member states are legally obliged to implement
EU directives, deficits have been detected to occur in terms of timing and the complete-
ness of implementation. For both aspects of implementation, variations involve several
dimensions such as time, country and policy area (see Figures 1 to 10 below).
As pointed out in section 3.2, academics’ answers to these implementation puzzles
usually focus on the timing of implementation explaining cross-country differences or on
single policy areas. Note that most of the literature only addresses EU directives. For
the latter, as opposed to other EU legislation, the implementation procedure is two-fold:
member state governments first have to transpose EU directives into national legislation
before they can be put into practice by national and local administrative authorities.
Within this set up, our analysis deals with the member states’ transposition decision
only. According to Treutlein (2007), it focuses on the first step of the transposition
decision, i.e. the member state government’s willingness to transpose EU directives. It
thereby follows the contention of Perkins & Neumayer (2007) that benefits arising from
union membership may guide a government’s transposition performance. Yet, as opposed
to Perkins & Neumayer (2007) we take on a policy-oriented view in addition to a cross-
country perspective. In particular, we investigate whether policy-specific membership
benefits help explain cross-sector transposition performances. Classical fiscal federalist
theory thereby serves us to assess the economic policy-specific benefits a member state
may derive from union membership.
3.3.2 The classical fiscal federalist argument
According to Oates (1972) and Oates (1999), centralization of policy prerogatives at
the upper governance level is economically efficient in policy areas with high levels of
interregional externalities and relatively low preference asymmetries amongst the lower
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level entities. This is so because in the absence of internalization of policy externalities
at the union level, sub-level entities would either choose inefficiently low policies (in the
case of positive externalities) or inefficiently high policies (in the case of negative exter-
nalities). Two examples may help. Consider e.g. two countries such as the Netherlands
and Germany and two policies, i.e. environment and transport.
In setting river pollution standards for national industries, Germany would only ac-
count for the costs of pollution in the Rhine river born by German firms. It would
not take into consideration any negative externalities arising further downstream in the
Netherlands and would be too tolerant compared to union welfare. A central authority
is needed to internalize the costs of negative spillovers.
In the case of positive spillovers, think of the construction of a high-speed railway
system. Germany would only consider its own passenger demands. It would not take the
possible positive spillovers for Dutch commuters into account when building its high-
speed railway track system. From a total welfare perspective, under decentralization,
Germany would decide to build too little railway tracks.
For a standard textbook introduction to externalities and public goods provision see
e.g. chapters 33 and 35 in Varian (2003).
Regarding the effect of preference asymmetries, Alesina & Wacziarg (1999) formally
model the trade-off between externalities and preference heterogeneity. They find that in
the case that public goods provision is characterized by spillovers, some centralization is
needed to internalize the externality. However, according to their model, these gains from
centralization must be traded-off against the costs from imposing the same policies upon
heterogeneous groups. Alesina, Baqir & Hoxby (2004) provide an empirical application
assessing this trade-off to the formation of jurisdictions, such as school districts, school
attendance areas or municipalities, in the US. They employ four measures of heterogene-
ity, i.e. heterogeneity in income, race, ethnicity, and religion. Their empirical analysis
reveals jurisdictions to be shaped, indeed, by a trade-off between economies of scale and
two particular aspects of preference heterogeneity, i.e. income and racial heterogeneity
respectively.
In short, from a CFF point of view the question of centralization depends above
all on the trade-off between the expected union’s welfare and the individual national
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preferences (see Oates (1972) and Oates (1999)).
3.3.3 Testable hypotheses
This paper seeks to analyze whether member states consider the union’s welfare in their
transposition decision. If so, we would expect transposition performances to be better
in policy areas where expected economic benefits on the union level are relatively high
compared to preference asymmetries amongst its members. According to CFF this would
be the case in policy areas that are efficiently centralized.
We are thus able to formulate the following testable hypotheses with a view to ex-
plaining cross-sector transposition performances:
H1 Member states prefer to transpose the union’s decisions in policy areas that CFF
predicts to be efficiently centralized.
Accordingly:
H1a Member states prefer to transpose a union’s decisions in policy areas with high
levels of externalities.
H1b Member states prefer to transpose a union’s decisions in policy areas evoking rela-
tively low preference asymmetries.
3.4 The data
3.4.1 Dependent variable
We measure a member state’s willingness to implement EU directives by its de facto
transposition performance, namely the ratio of notified transpositions to the number of
total directives adopted by the EU institutions in a given policy area and a given year.
Formally denote member countries by the index j = 1, ..., J , policy areas by i =
1, ..., N and years by t = 1, ..., T . The dependent variable (DV) may be expressed by:
yij,t =
1
Rij,t
Rij,t∑
r=1
1 (arij,t = 1) (3.1)
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where Rij,t directives pertaining to sector i in country j and in year t have been passed by
the EU. arij,t = 1 if for any directive r = 1, ..., Rij,t at least one transposition instrument
has been notified to the Commission by member state j in year t or thereafter, arij,t = 0
otherwise. Note that the index t refers to the adoption date of a directive in Brussels.
This convention reflects our working assumption that the decision of a government on
whether or not to transpose a directive follows immediately upon the official adoption
of a particular directive by the EU institutions. Also, from a statistical perspective, this
choice of t results in the smallest number of missing values in the dataset.
Data for our DV stems from the EU Commission online database CELEX Appendix
C Sector 7. arij,t is a dummy variable (anzcoyr d) which has been constructed by Ko¨nig
et al. (2005). It has kindly been provided to us within the DFG-sponsored research
project of Ko¨nig, von Hagen & Bra¨uninger (2002).
Thus, we effectively use the reverse measure of the “transposition deficit” defined in
the Internal Market Scoreboard (Nov. 2002, p.5) as “the percentage of Internal Market
directives not yet communicated as having been transposed, relative to the total number
of Internal Market directives which should have been transposed”. Transposition deficits
may easily be obtained from our DV by calculating 1− yij,t.
We have data on J = 15 countries, i.e. the EU15 member states, and T = 17
time periods, i.e. the years between the European Single Act in 1986 and the most
recent available year 2002. Directives are aggregated into policy areas by matching three
datasets with different sets of policy areas, namely the dataset for our DV (CELEX, 6
policy areas), the data for our main independent variables (CELEX according to Alesina
et al. (2005), 14 policy areas) and the data for our control variables such as value added
or employment shares (OECD STAN industries, 18 sectors). Table 3.1 demonstrates in
detail how our N = 5 policy areas arise, viz. agriculture, energy/environment, industry,
transport and public and social services. Clearly, the classification scheme is decisive for
comparative quantitative approaches and, to some extent, may drive empirical results.
Future research in the area of Europeanization should aim to develop a systematic and
uniform classification scheme comprising common classification numbers such as ISIC,
OECD STAN and CELEX in order to improve the comparability of empirical results.
Yet, our classification is a first attempt in this direction as it covers a range of five
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frequently cited policy areas and allows for traceability of policy areas by CELEX- ,
OECD STAN- and ISIC classification numbers. Not allowing for missings, we thus have
a total of N ∗ T ∗ J = 1275 observations in our dataset.
Now, let us take a closer look at Figures 1 to 10. Moving from a highly aggregated
point of view in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 to a dynamic cross-country cross-sector per-
spective in Figures 3.8, 3.7, 3.10, 3.9 and 3.6 reveals the full range of variation in our
dependent variable. Note that blank spaces indicate missing values. This is the case for
Finland, Sweden and Austria for the pre-EU-accession years 1986-1994. Further, keep
in mind that we display transposition ratios, not the absolute number of transposed
directives. For Belgium in 1987, a transposition record of 2 notifications for 4 directives
in the energy/environment sector thus results in approximately the same ratio of 0.5 as
11 notifications for 24 directives in the agriculture sector.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the transposition performances by country averaged over
sector and time, revealing the UK, Finland, Portugal and France as transposition lag-
gards with overall transposition deficits of approximately 38-35% for the period under
investigation. Regarding transposition ratios of policy areas averaged across time and
countries, Figure 3.2 demonstrates no substantial variation at first sight. However, con-
sidering that in total 1591 transpositions should have taken place in the transport sector
for the period under investigation renders a quite remarkable overall deficit of nearly
20% (≈ 300 directives) for the most completely transposed policy area. The importance
of complete implementation records is also what the EU Commission points at in its
Internal Market Scoreboards (IMS). See, for instance, Figure 6 in the IMS special issue
on “10 years of Internal Market without Frontiers” of November 2002. It lists in detail
any remaining deficits and progress made on the transposition of 10 key EU directives
across member states.
At a more disaggregated level, Figure 3.4 reveals quite remarkable differences in
mean transposition ratios over time for some member states. Take, for instance Por-
tugal, France, the UK and Denmark, where transposition ratios even fell below 50 at
the beginning of the 1990s. We notice a rather steady increase of transposition ratios
for the post-Maastricht period in Belgium and Portugal after a comparably slow start.
Comparing transposition ratios across policy areas, we find most variations for the pub-
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joint class CELEX STAN ISIC AAS policy
number name number name number name number description number name CELEX
reference
1 agriculture 3, 4 agriculture and fisheries 1 agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
01 to 05 6a agriculture
and fisheries
3, 4
2 energy/ envi-
ronment
12,15 energy/environment, con-
sumer and health protec-
tion
4, 18 electricity, gas and water,
energy producing activities
10 to 12,
23, 40, 41
mining and quarrying,
manufacture of coke,
refined petroleum prod-
ucts and nuclear fuel;
electricity, gas, steam
and hot water supply;
collection, purification and
distribution of water
5 environment 15.1
3 industry 13, 2, 17,
11
industrial policy and inter-
nal market
3, 19 total manufacturing,
wholesale and retail trade;
repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal
and household goods
15 to 37,
23, 50 to
52
manufacturing of food and
beverages, etc.; manu-
facture of coke, refined
petroleum products and
nuclear fuel; wholesale and
retail trade; repairs
6b industry and
energy
12, 13
(except
13.3)
4 transport 7 transport policy 7 transport and storage 60 to 63 land, water and air trans-
port
6c transport 7
5 public and so-
cial services
5, 6 freedom of movement of
workers and social policy;
right to establishment and
freedom to provide services
12, 13,
14, 15
community, social and per-
sonal services (- private
households) = total ser-
vices - financial services -
transport services
75 to 99,
80,85
public administration and
defense, compulsory social
security, education, health
and social work activities
2 common
market
6 (13.3,
10.4,
20.1)
T
ab
le
3.1:
C
lassifi
cation
of
p
olicy
areas
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lic and social services and energy/environment sector over time. Whereas transposition
ratios seem to follow a slightly decreasing trend in the transport sector, it is the other
way around for agriculture, industry and public and social services. All in all, however,
transposition ratios do not seem to follow a general pattern over time.
Finally, Figures 3.8 to 3.6 reveal the whole picture of variation in all three dimensions
of our DV. Apparently, member states have different priorities for transposition both,
across policy areas and time. Look, for example at the two Anglo-Saxon countries,
i.e. the UK and Ireland in figures 3.8 and 3.9, respectively. For the UK, transposition
appears most complete for transport and least complete for agriculture as well as public
and social services. For Ireland, on the other hand, transposition ratios seem highest in
the areas of public and social services and agriculture and lowest in industry.
The displayed figures reveal cross-sector differences in transposition performances to
be highly relevant for the study of Europeanization. Yet, multivariate regression analyses
are needed to uncover any systematic patterns such as those proposed in hypotheses H1-
H1b of section 3.3.
3.4.2 Explanatory variables
Main independent variables si
According to hypothesis H1 in section 3.3 our main explanatory variable is policy-specific
centralization efficiency. Following hypotheses H1a and H1b, the amount of sector ex-
ternalities and preference heterogeneity are the two main criteria for judging whether
centralization is economically efficient for a given policy area i. Due to the lack of data
on sector-specific externalities or preference asymmetries that would allow for compara-
tive analysis of our defined policy areas, we build upon the recent empirical investigation
of Alesina et al. (2005), henceforth referred to as AAS.
In the main part of their study on the EU’s actual decision-making activity, AAS
describe the assumed level of externalities and preference asymmetries for each of their
14 CELEX policy areas. Based on these categorizations, they further derive normative
judgments about the CFF-efficient allocation of policy prerogatives for each of these
areas. This is to say that policy areas for which they argue display high externalities and
low preference asymmetries between member states, such as e.g. the Common Market or
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policy area externality
low (l) medium low (ml) medium (m) medium high (mh) high (h)
1 agriculture 1 0 0 0 0
2 energy/envir. 0 0 0 1 0
3 industry 1 0 0 0 0
4 transport 0 0 0 1 0
5 public/social services 0 0 0 0 1
Table 3.2: Classification of policy-specific externalities into five levels
international relations, should accordingly be allocated at the union level and vice versa.
In a second step of their analysis, AAS empirically measure the de facto role the EU
plays for each policy area. They then compare this role with their normative judgment
based on CFF, yielding in a third step, a conclusion on whether the EU should be
more or less active in a given policy area, i.e. whether a policy area should be further
centralized at the union level or not. Table 12 in AAS’s study nicely summarizes their
categorizations and allocation findings for each of the defined policy areas.
Although a more objective and systematic assessment would generally be desirable in
future studies, AAS’s categorization scheme of policy externalities and preference asym-
metries seems generally intuitive and is mostly supported by arguments in similar studies
of the literature. Tabellini (2003), for instance, mainly agrees with AAS’s categorization
of policy areas regarding expected externalities and preference asymmetries. As opposed
to AAS’s judgment, however, Tabellini (2003) suggests better enforcement of the Single
Market via further centralization in this policy area.
Our categorization scheme is based on Table 12 of AAS and accordingly constructed
in two steps. First, we transfer AAS’s judgments of expected policy-externalities and
preference heterogeneity to five point scales for each of our five policy areas, see Tables
3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
Note, however, that our categorization on energy/environment and public and social
service is different. This is so as both policy areas are combinations of two different AAS-
policy fields, see our policy area classification of Table 3.1. We have decided to adopt
AAS’s categorization of the policy area for which we think the EU’s decision-making role
is larger. Put differently, we thus conform with AAS’s categorization for environment,
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policy area preference heterogeneity
low (l) medium low (ml) medium (m) medium high (mh) high (h)
1 agriculture 0 0 0 0 1
2 energy/envir. 0 0 0 0 1
3 industry 0 0 0 0 1
4 transport 0 0 1 0 0
5 public/social services 1 0 0 0 0
Table 3.3: Classification of policy-specific preference heterogeneity into five levels
CELEX no. 15.1; for public and social services, we categorize our variables along the
values for AAS’s Common Market, CELEX no. 6.
Furthermore, we have some doubts regarding the degree of expected externalities for
energy/environment and transport policies. For the former, AAS describe externalities
as “ambiguous”. This would directly be transferred to a “medium” level in our catego-
rization. We, however, find a classification of the externality degree “medium-high” more
adequate when thinking of examples such as the one of river pollution in section 3.2. For
the latter, against the backcloth of directive 1996/16 regulating the inter-operability of
the trans-European high-speed rail systems or directives 1994/55 and 2000/61 concern-
ing the harmonization of national legislation for road transport of dangerous goods a
classification of the externality level as “low” seems hardly justifiable. Making much
the same point, Kaeding (2006) provides a detailed overview on the development of 50
years of EU transport policy and gives further examples for the specific contents of single
transport directives. Also, transport policy mainly seems to affect technical regulations
and safety issues. Relative to the remaining policy areas harmonization benefits should
thus be rather obvious and should keep preference heterogeneity among member state
governments rather low. We therefore depart from AAS’s classification scheme and sug-
gest a classification into “high” for externality and a more moderate classification of
preference asymmetries into “medium”, see Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
The categorization of the two underlying sector characteristics, i.e. policy external-
ities and preference heterogeneity, is summarized in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4. The
second step in the process of constructing the main independent variables then consists of
defining a dummy variable central indicating for each policy area whether centralization
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policy area externalities preference heterogeneity CFF centralization
(externality) (prefhet) (central)
1 agriculture low high 0
2 energy/envir. medium high high 0
3 industry low high 0
4 transport high medium 1
5 public/social services high low 1
Table 3.4: Classification of policy areas for main explanatory variables si
would be economically efficient according to CFF, see column 4 of Table 3.4.
Each of the variables in Table 3.4 is represented by a set of dummy variables reflecting
the different categorizations. For instance, in the case of externality this results in three
dummy variables, i.e. one indicating the sectors with a high level of expected externalities
(externalityh), one for sectors with a medium-high level (externalitymh) and one for
sectors with a low level of expected policy externalities (externalityl). With a view to
avoiding collinearity problems in our estimations we only include one of our four main
independent variables and only all but one category dummies at a time. Since our main
sector-specific independent variables are time- and country-invariant we subsequently
refer to them as si comprising variables central, externality and prefhet.
Clearly, our measures of sector externalities and preference asymmetries need to be
improved in future comparative studies. This could be achieved by constructing a more
detailed index, by the collection of suitable data or via cross-sector case studies. Yet,
for a first explorative approach linking CFF to the study of Europeanization, we find
our measures satisfactory as they allow us to test hypotheses H1-H1b in a first tentative
approach.
Control variables
Additional to our main sector-specific variables si we consider different sets of control
variables, mj,t and zij,t. Where mj,t accounts for country-specific macro-economic and
political-institutional effects. While zij,t contains sector characteristics that have been
used in the literature or appear generally relevant for a country’s willingness to transpose.
In particular, we add the number of veto players vps accounting for institutional
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hurdles to national decision-making following Tsebelis (1995). Further, we control for
the strength of a government in the national executive-legislative relation by adding gov-
control and personal to our estimations. The former stands for a government’s agenda-
control in parliamentary (legislative) decision-making. Note that larger values on gov-
control indicate less agenda-control. Data for govcontrol is taken from Do¨ring (1995a).
The latter denotes the personal vote index of Do¨ring & Hallerberg (2004) which indicates
the degree of parliamentary fragmentation, i.e. the strength of possible parliamentary
opposition. Generally, we expect a government to transpose more, the more decision-
making power it wields, i.e. the less veto players there are and the stronger it is against
parliamentary opposition. In addition to these, we include a country-specific dummy
variable election accounting for years of parliamentary elections and possible policy cy-
cle effects. Data for election has been obtained from the PGL file collection of Cusack
& Engelhardt (2002) through the variable wahldatu.
As for macro-economic factors, we add GDP per capita in real terms and log-form, i.e.
gdppcrln, in order to capture a country’s general economic and administrative strength.
In line with the literature on Europeanization we assume wealthier countries to have
more administrative power and to accordingly be able to handle a greater workload of
directives. Data for gdppcrln is taken from the Eurostat database. In line with Perkins
& Neumayer (2007), Ko¨nig et al. (2005) and Treutlein (2007) we view the amount of net
EU receipts to play a positive role for a member state’s willingness to transpose EU law.
Data for neteureceipts is available in the statistical yearbooks provided by DeStatis.
Finally, we include empsh and labemp as further policy-specific characteristics mea-
suring the importance of the corresponding business sector for the national economy
and sector-specific labour compensation per employee, respectively. Both variables have
been shown to insert significant effects on the ratio of primary to total transpositions
in Treutlein (2007). Regarding the willingness to transpose, rather than the choice of
legal transposition instruments, we expect a positive effect of sector employment shares
and labour compensation schemes on transposition ratios. Data for both sector-specific
control variables are taken from the OECD STAN Indicators 2004.
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3.5 Empirical analysis
3.5.1 Econometric model
Our DV, denoted by Yij,t, is explained by the following general linear model:
Yij,t = E(Yij,t) + eij,t (3.2)
where E(Yij,t) is a linear regression component:
E(Yij,t) = β
′xij,t (3.3)
with xij,t = (1, si,mj,t, zij,t, t) where t denotes a linear time trend and β
′ = (γ0, ..., γ4).
The term eij,t is an error component. It can be decomposed into the sum of three random
parts: a country-specific µj, a policy-within-country νij and an idiosyncratic error εij,t.
Accordingly eij,t has a nested structure:
eij,t = µj + νij + εij,t (3.4)
where µj, νij and εij,t are assumed to satisfy standard assumptions, i.e. they are nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2µ, σ
2
ν and σ
2
ε respectively. Further,
they are supposed to be mutually and serially independent, as well as independent of
xij,t. The nested structure of the error component reflects the three dimensions of our
data. It seems theoretically adequate since it mirrors our presumption that random
country-specific effects, such as administrative culture, may play a role for a govern-
ment’s transposition willingness. Further, we expect transposition ratios across policy
areas to be more similar within one country than across countries.
Substitution of (3.3) and (3.4) into (3.2) yields the final linear two-way mixed model
to be estimated:
Yij,t = γ0 + γ1si + γ2mj,t + γ3zij,t + γ4t+ µj + νij + εij,t (3.5)
Recall that yij,t in (3.1) is bounded to lie within [0; 1] by definition. In order to estimate
the above linear model we thus apply the following log-odds transformation to yij,t as
discussed in Papke & Wooldridge (1996):
Yij,t = log
[
yij,t
(1− yij,t)
]
(3.6)
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such that Yij,t ∈ [−2.079; 4.959]. In order to be defined for all yij,t ∈]0; 1], this trans-
formation requires to manually adjust all maximum values of 1.00 to 0.99. Although
alternative estimation models are suggested by Papke & Wooldridge (1996) in order to
avoid arbitrary data adjustments, a log-odds transformation of yij,t in our case seems the
best way to account for the boundedness of our DV since it allows us to estimate a linear
model. Note also that, as compared to earlier work of Treutlein (2007), yij,t contains far
fewer observations on the extremes and, in particular, no zero values.
3.5.2 Estimation method
According to Baltagi, Song & Jung (2001), the γ coefficients of multilevel mixed models
such as the on in (3.5) may consistently and unbiasedly be estimated via pooled OLS
even if the variances µj, νij and εij,t are positive. However, pooled OLS would yield
biased standard errors. Alternatively, the coefficients and variance components may be
estimated by standard maximum likelihood (ML), provided that the error components
are Normal. Standard ML, however, ignores the loss of degrees of freedom due to regres-
sion coefficients in estimating the variance components. Restricted maximum likelihood
(REML) in return accounts for this loss of degrees of freedom. Given our large sample
size, the differences between standard ML and REML should, however, become negligibly
small.
As we are not only interested in coefficient signs and sizes, but also in detecting
the statistical significance of our independent variables and variance components, we
opt for a two-way mixed model estimation via REML. Following Baltagi et al. (2001),
REML yields consistent and unbiased results for coefficients, standard errors and variance
components even if the error component is nested and the data is highly unbalanced.
Further, REML is especially convenient as it is the default procedure for mixed model
estimations in STATA 9.
In order to test the robustness of our results we nevertheless compared our mixed
model estimates to the results retrieved from pooled OLS and random effects (RE) panel
regressions. As expected, the estimated coefficients for pooled OLS and RE have come
out very close to ours (in terms of signs and sizes). Significance levels, however, have
revealed differences, especially for pooled OLS.
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As mentioned above, all of our estimations are carried out in STATA 9 using the
xtmixed -command specifying a nested error component according to (3.4). The results
of additional estimations not displayed in Table 3.5 are available from the authors upon
request.
3.5.3 Estimation results
Table 3.5 below displays the results for five specifications of the two-way mixed model
estimations described above. Model 1 (m1) represents the basic model without any
policy-specific dummy variables. Models 2 (m2), 3 (m3) and 4 (m4) serve to test our
main hypotheses introducing the relevant policy-specific characteristics, i.e. central, ex-
ternality and prefhet, respectively. Model 5 (m5) provides a robustness check to these
including separate policy dummies. We thereby define agriculture as reference base.
The coefficiencts for the four remaining sector dummies accordingly reflect differences
in transposition ratios with respect to agriculture, i.e. the policy area for which central-
ization appears the least desirable according to CFF and AAS. The dummy variables
representing the levels of externalities and preference heterogeneity are to be interpreted
accordingly. For externality, the base is defined as low level of externalities. For pref-
erence heterogeneity the base is defined as high level of preference heterogeneity. Note
that in addition to the displayed coefficients all specifications include a linear time trend.
It has, however, not turned out to be significant in any model and is therefore left aside
in Table 3.5.
Let us briefly analyze the econometric adequacy of the displayed models. Throughout
all specifications, the Wald test against the hypothesis of all coefficients being zero is
very significant. Slight decreases in the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicate
increasing overall explanatory power of models 3-5, i.e. if the main sector variables are
included.
With respect to the specification of our nested error structure we find that except
for m1 all variance components are highly significant. This implies that there exist, in-
deed, random country- and sector-within-country effects which significantly influence our
dependent variable. Apparently, sector- and time-specific transposition patterns of one
particular member state are significantly different from those of another member state.
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Further, sector-specific transposition ratios are significantly different between member
states. Within one particular member state, transposition ratios across sectors vary
significantly. Over time, however, we do not find significant differences in sector trans-
position ratios. A highly significant likelihood ratio test statistic against the hypothesis
that our mixed model results do not differ significantly with respect to linear pooled
(OLS) regression further confirms the significance of our variance components.
Above all, the similarity of estimated coefficient sizes and signs both for the displayed
specifications as well as compared to pooled OLS and random effects results underlines
the robustness of our estimations. We are therefore confident that our model specifica-
tions yield econometrically valid and reliable results and proceed with interpreting the
theoretically interesting coefficients. To follow our interpretations also see Tables 6 to
11 in the appendix providing summary statistics for all variables.
From a policy perspective, we find a member state’s transposition ratio to increase
significantly if the policy area of a particular directive is efficiently centralized to the
EU-level according to CFF, see m2 respectively. Transposition ratios increase by 6.1
percentage points compared to inefficiently centralized policy areas. For the transport
sector, i.e. a policy area with a relatively small amount of EU directives (i.e. ≈ 1591
averaged over time and countries according to our dataset), this would already imply an
increase in transposition records by approximately 9-10 directives for the period under
investigation. Further, member states seem to significantly transpose more in policy areas
where higher levels of externalities are expected. Regarding preference asymmetries our
results are, however, ambiguous: member states appear to transpose more in policy
areas characterized by a medium level of preference heterogeneity. Yet, in policy areas
with low preference asymmetries transposition ratios are significantly smaller. Against
our intuition, sector employment shares (empsh) seem to insert a negatively significant
effect on transposition ratios. In contrast to Treutlein (2007) labour compensation per
employee (labemp) appears with a negative sign, but insignificant.
From a macro perspective, we find most of our control variables to significantly affect
a member state’s transposition decision in the anticipated direction. Only govcontrol
and GDP per capita do not appear statistically crucial for a country’s transposition
willingness.
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Concerning political-institutional variables, a higher number of veto players signifi-
cantly hinders the national transposition of EU directives. This result is very much in
line with our expectation and the literature on Europeanization and compliance. The
veto-player argument is further underlined by the statistically significant positive effect
of personal. Seemingly, member states with a higher score of the personal vote index
seem more willing to transpose. Assuming in line with Do¨ring & Hallerberg (2004) that
candidate-centered electoral system leads to more fragmented parliaments, this result
would support the hypothesis that systems with relatively strong executives and weaker
parliaments tend to transpose better. Further, member states tend to transpose signifi-
cantly more in years of parliamentary elections. Compared to non-election years, trans-
position ratios are approximately 3.4 percentage points higher. This result is opposite to
Treutlein (2007)’s investigation of the government’s choice of transposition instrument.
Interestingly, member states tend to transpose more in years of parliamentary elections,
but less via parliament. Future research is, however, needed for a well-founded judgment
on the impact of policy cycles on transposition.
From a macroeconomic view, our results strongly support the hypothesis that net
EU recipients are more willing to transpose EU directives. According to our estimations,
a member country’s transposition ratio increases by 0.0000061 for an increase of half a
billion Euros or, put differently, by approximately 3.9 percentage points for a 5%-increase
in net EU receipts. Although rather intuitive, this result stands in contrast to past find-
ings of Perkins & Neumayer (2007) and Ko¨nig et al. (2005) who could not find empirical
evidence in favor of the aforementioned hypothesis. Compared to Treutlein (2007), net
EU recipients seem to be more willing to transpose EU directives and primarily choose
to implement via secondary transposition devices, i.e. via instruments that due not in-
volve a decision in the national parliament. Further, we find evidence for larger countries
to transpose better than smaller ones. From an economic perspective this result seems
somewhat contraire to H1a in section 3.3. Smaller countries should generally collect
greater economic benefits from union membership than larger ones. However, consider-
ing EU15 member states only, the larger countries may also be the wealthier ones with
relatively better administrations. If this is the case, our result would well be in line with
the Europeanization literature proposing wealthier countries to transpose better.
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Finally, our estimations reveal that economically open countries with a large amount
of intra-EU15 exports transpose significantly more than their union colleagues. This
is well in line with Perkins and Neumayer’s conjecture of union benefits to encourage
a member states transposition willingness. It further is in line with H1a, as economic
theory leads us to expect externalities to play a greater role for economically more open
countries.
3.6 Conclusion
Explaining differences in the transposition of EU directives, we find that both factors
matter: political-economic macro- as well as policy-level factors. According to our mul-
tilevel econometric analysis, a member state’s willingness to transpose significantly in-
creases within years of parliamentary elections, with the degree of parliamentary frag-
mentation, with the size of a country, the amount of net EU receipts and intra-EU15
exports. In contrast, institutional veto players and national sector saliency are found to
be the main obstacles to transposition.
Interestingly, different sets of macroeconomic, institutional and policy variables seem
to explain variations in a country’s willingness to transpose and a country’s choice of
legal transposition instrument(s). Member states tend to transpose more in years of
parliamentary election, but less via primary legislation involving national parliaments.
Further, we find member state government’s to be more willing to transpose EU directives
if they receive large net EU transfers. Net EU recipients, however, also seem to prefer
secondary legislative devices to a higher degree than their colleagues. These results stand
in contrast to the somewhat contra-intuitive findings of Perkins & Neumayer (2007) and
Ko¨nig et al. (2005) regarding member state compliance and transposition delays.
With respect to our policy-oriented main hypotheses, CFF has proved to be useful
in explaining cross-policy differences in transposition. In line with Perkins & Neumayer
(2007), we find empirical evidence that union members do consider the union’s overall
benefits in their implementation decision. Apparently, member states are more willing
to transpose EU directives in policy areas that are efficiently centralized to the EU level.
Regarding the underlying efficiency criteria our results are, however, ambiguous: In line
with our perception, member states seem to transpose more in policy areas with higher
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transposedodd m1 m2 m3 m4 m5
vps -0.137 * -0.133 * -0.127 * -0.135 * -0.133 *
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
govcontrol 0.046 0.037 0.030 0.028 0.027
(0.065) (0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.068)
election 0.219 ** 0.220 ** 0.217 ** 0.219 ** 0.219 **
(0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
empsh -0.012 ** -0.014 ** 0.018 ** 0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.019)
labemp -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 *** -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
personal 0.109 ** 0.111 ** 0.110 * 0.112 ** 0.112 *
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
popln 0.331 *** 0.330 *** 0.361 *** 0.322 *** 0.326 ***
(0.119) (0.121) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124)
gdppcrln 0.538 0.516 0.499 0.619 0.590
(0.418) (0.421) (0.428) (0.423) (0.428)
neteureceipts 3.9e+05 ** 3.9e+05 ** 4.0e+05 ** 3.9e+05 ** 3.9e+05 **
(1.6e+05) (1.6e+05) (1.6e+05) (1.6e+05) (1.6e+05)
exportseu15 0.026 *** 0.028 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.031 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
central 0.435 **
(0.188)
externalityh -0.017
(0.219)
externalitymh 1.743 ***
(0.360)
prefhetm 1.399 ***
(0.172)
prefhetl -0.373 **
(0.158)
denergyenvir 0.217
(0.483)
dindustry 0.242
(0.724)
dtransport 1.529 ***
(0.333)
dpubsoc -0.159
(0.562)
constant -31.997 -29.231 -40.968 -29.788 -30.926
(34.340) (34.504) (34.853) (34.551) (34.697)
log(sd(µj)) -1.691 -1.512 * -1.167 *** -1.090 *** -1.085 ***
(1.095) (0.785) (0.435) (0.343) (0.345)
log(sd(νij)) -0.492 *** -0.553 *** -0.887 *** -1.488 *** -1.433 ***
(0.143) (0.148) (0.205) (0.418) (0.392)
log(sd(εij)) 0.252 *** 0.251 *** 0.253 *** 0.253 *** 0.254 ***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
N 717 717 717 717 717
Wald chi2 33.37 *** 39.02 *** 64.78 *** 116.68 *** 114.02 ***
BIC 2638.176 2641.061 2630.836 2610.910 2622.441
ll -1269.77 -1267.93 -1259.53 -1249.57 -1248.76
LR test 68.84 *** 62.98 *** 30.82 *** 18.58 *** 19.12 ***
Table 3.5: Two-way mixed model estimation results
108
levels of externalities. However, compared to sectors with high preference asymmetries,
we find member states to transpose significantly more in sectors with medium prefer-
ence asymmetries but significantly less if preference heterogeneity is low. For a final
judgement on hypotheses H1, H1a and H1b, however, further empirical research needs
to be undertaken and both underlying measures of sector externalities and preference
heterogeneity improved.
With an eye on future multilevel comparative studies, our econometric analysis has
detected random country- and sector-within-country effects to play a statistically signif-
icant role for analyzing transposition ratios. Mixed model estimations in STATA 9 have
proved as a promising way to econometrically account for these influences. Given these
results, applying pooled OLS would still yield consistent coefficients, but render biased
inference regarding their statistical significance.
In summary, our study has shown that the optimal allocation of policy prerogatives is
not only important from an economic, fiscal federalist perspective. It also carries political
implications regarding the implementation of decisions within international unions. In
the case of the European Union, enhancing unitarisation, i.e. creating a political union
in addition to the Common Market, would accordingly require an economically efficient
allocation of policy areas at the EU level. Classical fiscal federalist theory may serve as
fruitful playing field for further theoretical modeling explaining the observed cross-policy
variations in member states’ implementation performances.
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3.A Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposedodd 1140 1.65 1.58 −2.08 4.60
transposed 1140 0.76 0.20 0.11 1.00
vps 1025 2.41 1.30 1.00 6.00
govcontrol 1275 3.73 1.69 1.00 7.00
election 1275 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
personal 1275 2.37 2.47 0.20 7.60
empsh 1111 15.77 15.11 0.40 47.20
labemp 1095 109.23 61.28 2.60 293.50
popln 1275 9.43 1.34 5.91 11.32
gdppcrln 1275 −3.89 0.28 −4.65 −3.18
neteureceipts 980 −960.44 4840.06 −25406.20 10444.00
exportseu15 1275 21.81 14.53 4.00 62.20
central 1275 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
externalityh 1275 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
externalitymh 1275 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
externalityl 1275 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
prefheth 1275 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
prefhetm 1275 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
prefhetl 1275 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Table 3.6: Summary statistics
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposed 228 0.77 0.17 0.13 1.00
empsh 241 6.93 5.05 1.00 19.60
labemp 239 23.40 14.07 2.60 69.60
central 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalitymh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityl 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefheth 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefhetm 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.7: Summary statistics for policy area 1: agriculture
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposed 228 0.71 0.22 0.17 1.00
empsh 240 1.26 0.65 0.40 3.00
labemp 238 192.51 42.57 121.80 293.50
central 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalitymh 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
externalityl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefheth 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefhetm 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.8: Summary statistics for policy area 2: energy/environment
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposed 228 0.76 0.16 0.25 1.00
empsh 234 38.27 3.38 30.40 47.20
labemp 238 97.39 7.29 75.00 107.35
central 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalitymh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityl 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefheth 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefhetm 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.9: Summary statistics for policy area 3: industry
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposed 228 0.85 0.18 0.17 1.00
empsh 183 4.41 0.67 2.60 5.80
labemp 175 122.18 19.49 97.20 186.50
central 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
externalityh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalitymh 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
externalityl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefheth 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetm 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
prefhetl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.10: Summary statistics for policy area 4: transport
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
transposed 228 0.70 0.21 0.11 1.00
empsh 213 27.19 5.05 19.00 40.30
labemp 205 115.30 18.62 86.50 182.10
central 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
externalityh 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
externalitymh 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
externalityl 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefheth 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetm 255 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
prefhetl 255 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Table 3.11: Summary statistics for policy area 5: public and social services
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Figure 3.1: Transposition ratios per member state, averaged across years and policy
areas
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Figure 3.2: Transposition ratios per policy area, averaged across years and member states
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Figure 3.3: Transposition ratios per year, averaged across policy areas and member states
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Figure 3.4: Transposition ratios per member state and year, averaged across policy areas
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Figure 3.5: Transposition ratios per policy area and year, averaged across member states
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Figure 3.6: Transposition ratios per policy area and year for Austria (A), Finland (FIN)
and Sweden (SW)
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Figure 3.7: Transposition ratios per policy area and year for Belgium (B), Denmark
(DK) and The Netherlands (N)
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Figure 3.8: Transposition ratios per policy area and year for France (F), Germany (D)
and United Kingdom (UK)
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Figure 3.9: Transposition ratios per policy area and year for Ireland (IR), Greece (GR)
and Spain (SP)
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Figure 3.10: Transposition ratios per policy area and year for Italy (I), Luxembourg (L)
and Portugal (P)
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Policy implications and conclusion
The empirical findings of chapters 1, 2 and 3 lead to the following policy implications:
First, if the EU is striving for complementing economic integration by a ‘political
unitarisation’ in the sense of an equal application of EU law in the member states,
our results suggest, in line with Alesina et al. (2005) and Tabellini (2003), that the
allocation of policy prerogatives should be reconsidered and possibly reformed. This
is because our empirical investigation reveals policy-specific transposition ratios to be
significantly higher if this policy is efficiently centralized to the EU level. Classiscal
fiscal federalist theory has proved useful in judging the allocation of policy prerogatives
within multi-level institutional settings.
Second, from a normative perspective, the democratic deficit of the EU had better
be addressed and the public debate be expanded to national transposition processes.
Specifically, our analysis of the choice of legal transposition instruments used has shown
that member state executives may have the power and incentives to strategically and
systematically circumvent national parliaments when it comes to the transposition of
EU law into national legislation.
Generally speaking, in order to prevent implementation problems from the outset,
reforms of the EU decision-making process should always be accompanied by considera-
tions of how policies are enforced, especially in an enlarged Europe.
With respect to cultural diplomacy, our empirical results should not be seen to ques-
tion the overall importance of European cultural institutes and their staff for cultural
diplomacy. Rather, they emphasize the necessity of clear-cut cultural political and eco-
nomic goals, thorough data collection and performance evaluation in this policy area.
The transparency and traceability of cultural policy outcomes need to be improved, not
the least since ‘culture’ needs to compete with other policy areas for a share in govern-
120
ment budgets and for other kinds of public and private funds. In this respect, statistic
methods could be a useful tool for providing explicit and objective figures for political
and economic decision-makers.
Hopefully, the above empirical analyses and results are stimulating for practitioners,
political decision-makers and scientists alike. It goes without saying that further theo-
retical and empirical work is needed to reinforce and refine our results. In that sense it
appears apt to conclude with the words of Sir Isaac Newton,
‘What we know is a drop; what we don’t know is an ocean.’.
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